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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AT 50: FOUR HISTORIES
Kyle Graham*
ABSTRACT
This article offers four different perspectives on the strict products-liability
“revolution” that climaxed a half-century ago. One of these narratives relates the
prevailing assessment of how this innovation coalesced and spread across the
states. The three alternative histories introduced by this article both challenge
and complement the standard account by viewing the shift toward strict products
liability through populist, practical, and contingent lenses, respectively. The first
of these narratives considers the contributions that plaintiffs and their counsel
made toward this change in the law. The second focuses upon how certain types
of formerly common, but now moribund, products cases framed the argument for
strict products liability as a superior alternative to negligence. The third
examines why tort law eclipsed warranty as the principal doctrinal forum for
products-liability reform. These non-canonical accounts have been obscured, this
article concludes, due to blind spots and biases that recur across descriptions of
doctrinal development in tort law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Depending upon when the clock started to run, strict products liability
recently observed, or is now celebrating, its fiftieth birthday. In 1960, the New Jersey
Supreme Court breached the walls of the “citadel” of privity in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., a warranty case.1 Three years later, the California Supreme Court formally
adopted a tort theory of recovery for products liability, regardless of fault, in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.2 And 1964 witnessed the final approval of the
long-awaited Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A, which announced a basic
framework of rules to govern strict products liability in tort.3 Today, these three
events are widely recognized as touchstone moments in a products-liability
“revolution”4 that swept the nation and has been described as “the most rapid and
altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire history of the law
of torts.”5
The swift ascendance of strict products liability, whether framed in tort or
warranty, has prompted thoughtful examinations of how and why this doctrine
coalesced and gained acceptance. As to the “how,” these accounts all drape around a
handful of trends and events that represent generally accepted milestones in the
development of products liability. Meanwhile, two explanations have come to frame
the “why” component of the discussion. The first focuses upon the roles played by a
select group of judges and academics in molding and proselytizing the core concepts
that underlie strict liability to the consumer.6 Another account concentrates less on
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). The “citadel” metaphor for the
privity requirement was coined by Justice Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445
(N.Y. 1931).
2 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Though formally published in 1965, this section
had been approved by the members of the American Law Institute in May 1964. Friday Afternoon
Session, May 22, 1964, 41 A.L.I. PROC. 324, 375 (1965). This provision remains perhaps the most-cited
of all Restatement sections. See Henry J. Reske, Experts Tackle Torts Restatement, ABA J., Aug. 1992, at
18, 18 (observing that Section 402A “has been cited by courts far more than any other part of any
ALI restatement”).
4 Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Deacademification of Tort Theory, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 59, 60
(1999).
5 William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 793–94
(1966). See also Editor’s Scratch Pad, AM. TRIAL LAWYERS ASS’N BULL., Mar. 1965, at 38, 39
(“Sometimes progress in tort law comes not in isolated individual advances but in onrushing
battalions. This is surely true of the yeasty field of products liability where development of the law
since World War II has been spectacular & moved with lightning-like speed.”).
6 E.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 168 (1980) (“The
dramatic rise of strict liability theory in defective products cases between the 1940s and 1970 furnishes
a striking example of the way in which tort law has been shaped by the interactions of influential
scholars and visible appellate judges.”); Robert C. Bird & Roger J. Smythe, Social Network Analysis and
the Diffusion of the Strict Liability Rule for Manufacturing Defects, 1963 – 1987, 37 LAW & SOC. INQ. 565
(2013); James R. Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual Origins of American Strict Products Liability: A Case Study in
American Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 39 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 443 (1995); David Owen, The Intellectual
1
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the contributions of individuals than on the environment that allegedly inspired
them. This description assigns motive force to broad, vaguely defined economic,
political, and cultural trends that, by the middle of the twentieth century, supposedly
aligned to make strict products liability inevitable.7
Repetition of these accounts over the years has tended to marginalize other
aspects of strict products liability’s emergence. As this doctrine enters its second
half-century, this article excavates its foundations and identifies three hidden
histories buried under the prevailing dialogue.8 These additional narratives
complement and challenge the existing literature by offering populist, practical, and
contingent accounts, respectively, of strict products liability’s emergence: three new
lenses through which to view this change in the law.9 The first of these stories
concerns the heretofore overlooked role of consumers and the emerging plaintiff’s
personal-injury bar in generating the raw material—cases—for the products-liability
revolution. The second considers the practical problems that drove mid-century
courts toward strict products liability, with a focus upon the issues presented by
certain recurring case types that were prominent at the time of strict products
liability’s inception, but are now almost extinct. And the third examines the element
of chance associated with the development and adoption of a theory of strict
products liability framed in tort, as opposed to a solution more closely tethered to
the previously prevailing language of warranty.
The first of these supplemental narratives relates how consumers and their
attorneys provided the momentum for the products-liability avalanche. Accounts of
Development of Modern Product Liability Law: A Comment on Priest’s View of the Cathedral’s Foundation, 14 J.
LEG. STUD. 529 (1985); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). See also Jane Stapleton, Bugs in
Anglo-American Products Liability, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (2002) (“Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts . . . was a top-down law reform motivated, not by social or forensic pressures, but
by the enthusiasm of a small group of Legal Realists that saw the opportunity to make what they saw
as a small win-win change to legal entitlements.”).
7 E.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA.
L. REV. 601, 601–03 (1992).
8 The phrase “hidden histories” is borrowed from JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND
COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW (2007).
9 For a discussion of torts scholarship representative of a “contingency” approach, see John Fabian
Witt, Contingency, Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of Accidents, 1 J. TORT LAW 1, 16–34 (2007).
Professor Witt also delved into the contingencies associated with the development of modern
American accident law in JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2006) and John
Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative FirstParty Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690 (2001). Meanwhile, the word “practical,” as used here,
signifies that this supplemental narrative is less concerned with whether and how elites kept the law in
line with broader social trends (i.e., a broad “functionalist” narrative), than with how a larger cast of
judges may have viewed strict products liability as a fix for more mundane problems that recurred on
their dockets. For a discussion and critique of functionalist legal histories, see Robert W. Gordon,
Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
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doctrinal change tend to dwell upon the contributions of judges and academics,
whose contributions are neatly captured in decisions, articles, and citations.
Individual plaintiffs and their attorneys, meanwhile, normally attract attention only
when associated with leading cases. But the lawsuits that led to the development and
adoption of strict products liability did not appear out of thin air. Plaintiffs had to
recognize an injury, connect their harm to a product, and appreciate the prospect of
recovery; lawyers had to be willing to take these cases and present them effectively.
As it happens, strict products liability unfurled in synch with evolving claim
consciousness among prospective plaintiffs and enhanced sophistication of personalinjury counsel. Members of the public appreciated the existence of some products
claims before they discerned others; predictably, the law followed a similar path.
Meanwhile, in the years following World War II, plaintiffs’ counsel came to perceive
products liability as an ennobling and potentially lucrative area of practice, and
improved knowledge-sharing networks among these attorneys made these cases less
daunting to pursue. These conditions ultimately produced the lawsuits that provided
the nation’s courts with ample fodder for a doctrinal shift.
The second narrative explains why strict products liability was endorsed not
only by Dean William Prosser and Justice Roger Traynor, but also by the C. William
O’Neills10 and Hamilton S. Burnetts11 of the legal world. This story considers how
certain types of products lawsuits made a practical case for products liability by
framing the argument for this innovation and auditioning it during its gestational
phase. Specifically, this article focuses upon the doctrinal pressures created by a
particular type of products-liability lawsuit, the so-called “bottle case.” Origin stories
of strict products liability must account for Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,12
the California Supreme Court case in which Justice Traynor used a lawsuit over a
broken soda bottle to sketch the arguments for strict liability.13 Most commentators
appreciate the prescience of Traynor’s opinion; fewer recognize the ubiquity of the
fact pattern he addressed. Between the 1940s and 1960s, exploding or bursting
beverage bottles probably generated more products-liability lawsuits than did any
other single consumer good. These “bottle cases” also placed more strain on generic
negligence principles than did most other products cases. As these lawsuits mounted,
so too did the argument for a strict-liability approach. Yet these contributions toward
C. William O’Neill was an associate justice on the Ohio Supreme Court, and wrote the majority
opinion in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 218 N.E.2d 185 (Oh. 1966), in which the court adopted
strict products liability in tort.
11 Hamilton S. Burnett was a Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court and the author of Ford
Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966), in which that court adopted strict products liability
in tort. No disrespect is intended toward either Justice O’Neill or Justice Burnett by referencing them;
the point is simply to underscore that strict products liability appealed to more than a handful of
academics and similarly minded judges.
12 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
13 Id. at 440–44 (Traynor, J., concurring).
10
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the strict products-liability revolution are today forgotten. With bottle cases now
rare, it is easy to underestimate how they once may have weighed on minds of even
relatively conservative judges.
Finally, this article considers the contingencies associated with the
ascendance of a strict-liability theory rooted firmly in tort (as packaged by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A), as opposed to an approach grounded
in warranty. Strict products liability in tort spread across the country like wildfire. It
took less than 25 years from the Greenman decision onward for 45 states to ground
their consumer protections in this new branch of tort law. Yet more than a quartercentury after Wyoming became the last state to clamber aboard the bandwagon, five
states still prefer to cast their enhanced consumer protections in the language of
warranty. As discussed herein, these holdouts underscore two fortuitous
circumstances associated with the adoption of a tort approach to strict products
liability. First, this doctrine capitalized upon a period of transition in warranty law,
which otherwise might have fully absorbed the energies for doctrinal change.
Second, a critical mass of states adopted strict products liability during a brief
window in which a preemption argument premised on states’ contemporaneous
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code had not fully matured. Had
circumstances aligned only slightly differently, strict products liability—to the extent
that it is truly strict at all—easily could have followed a somewhat different doctrinal
route in many jurisdictions, one that relied principally on warranty, as opposed to
tort.
This article proceeds as follows. This Introduction is followed by Section II,
which offers a standard retelling of the path toward strict products liability, and a
summary of the prevailing explanations for this transition. Sections III through V
then elaborate upon the three narratives described above. Finally, Section VI relates
how the obscurity of these stories owes to biases and blind spots in the composition
and consolidation of histories of doctrinal development in tort law. As others have
noted, accounts of doctrinal movement commonly overlook the groundwork laid by
prospective plaintiffs and their attorneys; ignore case tropes as a profitable unit of
analysis; and downplay the fortuitous circumstances associated with the diffusion of
almost every “successful” new idea in the law.14 But by pulling these subjects out of
the shadows, one can better understand some of the complexities inherent in the
processes of doctrinal change.

See Gordon, supra note 9, at 71 (opining that “Realist functionalism almost unconsciously reserves
even what it believes to be the very marginal opportunities for legal influence on the direction of
social change to an elite of policymakers: Mass movements and local struggles are not ordinarily
thought of as makers of legal change,” and that “essential working assumptions [of this approach]
misleadingly objectify history, making highly contingent developments appear to have been
necessary.”).
14
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II. THE CONVENTIONAL NARRATIVE: LANDMARK CASES, ELITES, AND TRENDS
From the first state to adopt it through the forty-fifth, strict products liability
in tort swept through the nation’s courts faster than any other major doctrinal shift
in the history of modern tort law. But the rapid adoption of strict products liability
came only after a very long incubation period. This gestational era incorporated a
series of signal trends and events for which all origin stories must account. Following
is a fairly conventional retelling of these developments.
A. A Brief History of Strict Products Liability
1. Winterbottom and the Privity Requirement
The first landmark event in the history of modern products liability is the
decision of the English Court of Exchequer in Winterbottom v. Wright.15 Decided in
1842, Winterbottom quickly became the leading stateside authority for a “privity of
contract” (or simply “privity”) requirement for the recovery in negligence against a
manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer for injuries associated with a defective product.
The plaintiff in Winterbottom was an English postman who worked for a
contractor who had, in turn, been retained by the Postmaster General to deliver the
mail.16 The plaintiff’s duties required that he use a coach provided by the defendant,
who had entered into a contract with the Postmaster General to supply and maintain
these vehicles.17 Due to “certain latent defects,” the coach broke down while the
plaintiff was driving it, causing the plaintiff to become lamed for life.18 The plaintiff
brought suit against the supplier of the coach, alleging negligence.19
In rejecting the plaintiff’s suit, the Court of Exchequer stressed the absence
of privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. Per Lord Abinger’s
opinion,
if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing
along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might
bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such
contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most
absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit,
would ensue.20
Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 10 Meeson & Welsby 109.
Id. at 109–10.
17 Id. at 109.
18 Id. at 110.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 114.
15
16
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Winterbottom did not bar any and all recoveries by plaintiffs who lacked
contractual privity with the manufacturer or other seller of a defective product.
Significantly, Baron Alderson’s concurring opinion in Winterbottom distinguished the
recently decided case of Langridge v. Levy.21 The court in Langridge had allowed a
plaintiff, a minor, to recover for injuries caused by defective gun that had been
purchased from the defendant by the plaintiff’s father. The seller had represented to
the father that the gun was safe. Alderson saw the Langridge plaintiff’s claim as
sounding in fraud.22 Since there were no comparable representations made in
Winterbottom, the plaintiff could not recover.23 In distinguishing Langridge in this
manner, Alderson left open a narrow aperture for plaintiffs who could cast their
products claims in the language of deceit. In the years that followed, however,
relatively few plaintiffs framed their cases this way, likely because the required
representations and reliance rarely appeared.24
2. MacPherson and the Demise of Privity in Negligence Cases
American audiences appreciated Winterbottom as a leading case in the area of
products liability,25 but soon carved out a significant exception to its rule. In Thomas
Id. at 113–14, 115–16.
Langridge v Levy (1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 863, 2 Meeson & Welsby 519.
23 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Meeson & Welsby at 116.
24 Note, Sales-Manufacturer and Dealers-Liability of a Supplier of Goods to One Other than His Immediate
Vendee, 21 MINN. L. REV. 315, 321 (1937) (stating that “as a practical matter, this solution offers little
protection to the ultimate consumer, because very seldom can he prove the elements necessary to
maintain this action.”). Framed broadly, the Langridge holding can be understood as the wellspring for
later decisions that allowed plaintiffs to recover against product manufacturers, notwithstanding a lack
of privity of contract, by pleading and proving that the manufacturers had communicated express
warranties to them through advertising or other representations. E.g., Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car
Co., 288 N.W. 309, 313 (Mich. 1939); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 139 N.E.2d 871, 886
(Oh. 1957); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409, 412 (Wash. 1932).
25 Most American torts treatises of the late 1800s and early 1900s lined up behind the Winterbottom
rule. E.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY & JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS: OR THE
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT § 373 (Student Ed. 1907) (“The general rule
is that a contractor, manufacturer, vendor or furnisher of an article is not liable to third parties who
have no contractual relations with him for negligence in the construction, manufacture or sale of such
article.”); WILLIAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 232a (1896); 2 EDWIN A.
JAGGARD, HAND-BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 260 (1895); THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A.
REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW ON NEGLIGENCE § 54 (1880); FRANCIS WHARTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE §§ 439–40 (1874). That said, a few of the leading treatises of
that period failed to mention Winterbottom in their discussions of products liability. E.g., FRANCIS M.
BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW
AND UNDER MODERN STATUTES FOR ACTIONABLE WRONGS TO PERSON AND PROPERTY § 550 (3d
ed. 1913). One treatise appears to have regarded Winterbottom as stating an exception to the general rule:
The general result may be stated to be, that if the defendant intended or if he can
fairly be assumed to have intended the acts of the intermediate agency, as where he
expects or contemplates them, —for instance by making a railway carriage, to be
used by passengers of the railway company for which it is made—he will be liable,
though his act was a breach of contract with another.
21
22
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v. Winchester,26 decided in 1852, a bottle of poison was erroneously given an
innocuous label by the defendant, sold through a series of intermediaries, and
ultimately purchased by the husband of the unfortunate consumer.27 In allowing the
husband and wife’s negligence suit to proceed, the New York Court of Appeals
genuflected to Winterbottom’s reasoning and result, but found its rule inapposite in
situations where the product involved was “imminently dangerous to human life.”28
Other jurisdictions came to recognize a similar exception.29 These decisions
and other authorities phrased this principle in different ways. One leading treatise
provided that the privity rule did not bar claims where “the act of negligence is one
which in its nature endangers human life.”30 The Massachusetts Supreme Court
bypassed the privity requirement in a case that involved “the furnishing of provisions
which endanger human life or health.”31 The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to
bar a plaintiff’s lawsuit when the defendant, a manufacturer of ladders, “had reason
to apprehend that the use of it by the plaintiff, or by any one, would be attended by
serious personal injury.”32 And the New York Court of Appeals later applied the
exception in cases involving a collapsing scaffold33 and an exploding coffee urn34—
potentially dangerous items, to be certain, but not quite as obviously so as mislabeled
poison.
These cases set the stage for the 1916 decision by the New York Court of
Appeals in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company.35 MacPherson involved a 1911 Buick
automobile that “suddenly collapsed,” injuring the owner.36 Turned plaintiff, the
owner attributed the accident to a defective wheel supplied by a components
MELVILLE MADISON BIGELOW, THE LAW OF TORTS 189–90 (8th ed. 1907) (distinguishing
Winterbottom with a “but see” signal in an accompanying footnote) (footnotes omitted).
26 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
27 Id. at 405–06.
28 Id. at 408.
29 E.g., Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143, 144 (Mass. 1870). Furthermore, some jurisdictions
recognized exceptions to the general privity rule where “an owner’s act of negligence which causes
injury to one who is invited by him to use his defective appliance upon the owner’s premises may
form the basis of an action against the owner,” or (drawing from the Langridge precedent) when “one
who sells or delivers an article which he knows to be imminently dangerous to life or limb to another
without notice of its qualities [and] any person . . . suffers an injury therefrom which might have been
reasonably anticipated.” Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865, 870–71 (8th Cir. 1903).
30 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 25, at § 54.
31 Bishop v. Weber, 1 N.E. 154, 154 (Mass. 1885).
32 Schubert v. J.R. Clark Co., 51 N.W. 1103, 1106 (Min. 1892).
33 Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 478 (N.Y. 1882).
34 Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063, 1064–65 (N.Y. 1909).
35 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). For a detailed evaluation of the
MacPherson case, see James A. Henderson, Jr., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.: Simplifying the Facts While
Reshaping the Law, in TORTS STORIES 41 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, eds., 2003).
36 MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051.
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manufacturer and integrated by Buick into the finished vehicle, allegedly without
adequate inspection.37 Because the automobile had been purchased from an
intermediary dealer, as a defendant Buick naturally pointed out the lack of privity of
contract between it and the plaintiff.38 The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Justice
Cardozo, held that the lack of privity did not protect Buick. Drawing upon and
engrossing Thomas and its progeny, the MacPherson court rejected a privity
requirement in negligence actions where “the nature of [the product] is such that it is
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made.”39
MacPherson’s diminution of privity requirement dovetailed with ongoing shifts
in the market for consumer goods. The rise of mass production40 and the
transportation revolution of the 1800s and early 1900s41 placed physical distance
between the makers and users of many products, limiting the consumer’s ability to
interrogate the manufacturer about the qualities of its goods. This distance was
accompanied by the introduction of wholesaler and retailer intermediaries into the
supply chain,42 which further alienated consumers from the manufacturers of the
products they purchased. Also, product branding—a relative novelty as late as the
1880s43—became a central part of many companies’ marketing strategies, with
manufacturers turning more and more toward advertising, packaging, and promotion
to influence how consumers perceived their products.44 Finally, at the point of sale,
Id.
Henderson, supra note 35, at 48–49 (discussing Buick’s strategy on appeal).
39 Id.
40 See generally DAVID A. HOUNSHELL, FROM THE AMERICAN SYSTEM TO MASS PRODUCTION, 1800–
1932 (1984) (tracking this evolution).
41 See JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN EMPIRE OF WEALTH: THE EPIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN
ECONOMIC POWER 148–49 (2004) (discussing how the expansion of railroads contributed toward the
creation of a national market); RICHARD S. TEDLOW, NEW AND IMPROVED: THE STORY OF MASS
MARKETING IN AMERICA 12–13 (1996) (discussing improvements in transportation and
communication and their effects on market development).
42 Cornelius W. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 OR. L. REV. 119, 129 (1957) (“In a bygone
age, when goods were largely made to order by local craftsmen, no legal distinctions between
manufacturers and retailers were generally necessary to protect the consumer.”); Note, SalesManufacturer and Dealers-Liability of a Supplier of Goods to One Other than His Immediate Vendee, supra note
24, at 315 n.2; Note, The Marketing Structure and Judicial Protection of the Consumer, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 77,
78–82 (1937).
43 SUSAN STRASSER, SATISFACTION GUARANTEED: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN MASS MARKET
37 (1989).
44 See CHARLES F. MCGOVERN, SOLD AMERICAN: CONSUMPTION AND CITIZENSHIP, 1890–1945 10
(2006) (“only between 1880 and 1930 did Americans come to depend on the commercial marketplace,
with few feasible alternatives, for the necessities of modern life.”); DANIEL POPE, THE MAKING OF
MODERN ADVERTISING 49–51 (1983); DANIEL STARCH, PRINCIPLES OF ADVERTISING 32–34, 764
(1923) (discussing the growth in print advertising venues in the years leading up to 1922, and charting
the nearly 100-fold increase in trademarks registered annually between 1870 and 1921); STRASSER,
supra note 43, at 52–57; Robert S. Lynd, The People as Consumers, in 2 RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S RESEARCH COMMISSION ON SOCIAL TRENDS at 857,
871–77 (1933) (discussing trends in advertising and branding); Note, Advertising and Buyer’s Remedies, 6
37
38
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customers gravitated toward large stores45 and chain retailers46 with showrooms that
offered an ever-broader array of items47—but were staffed by clerks who often knew
little about these goods, and were in no position to advise consumers about their
proper use.48 Combined, these trends threatened to make a lack of privity an
increasingly common, and increasingly unfair, defense for product manufacturers
who failed to act with reasonable care.49
Whether because of these changes50 or simply concurrently with them,
almost every state adopted the MacPherson rule between 1916 and 1960.51 In most of
VAND. L. REV. 376, 376 (1953) (discussing the prevalence of consumer advertising). By the early
1900s, branding and advertising had made a significant impact on consumer preferences. A 1917
study published in the Journal of Applied Psychology found that almost all consumers could identify at
least one brand of twenty commonly used household products, and that advertising represented one
of the principal influences upon purchasing decisions. L.R. Geissler, Association-Reactions Applied to
Ideas of Commercial Brands of Familiar Articles, 1 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 278 (1917).
45 See, e.g., JAN WHITAKER, SERVICE AND STYLE: HOW THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT STORE
FASHIONED THE MIDDLE CLASS 8–29 (2006) (surveying the history of downtown department stores
from 1900 to 1960).
46 See POPE, supra note 44, at 257 (relating that chain stores accounted for 36.6 percent of retail sales in
1963, as compared to 22 percent in 1929); Lynd, supra note 44, at 870 (“It is only since 1900 that
chains may be said to have gained real momentum, while only since the World War have they
emerged into a position of dominance in distribution.”); Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store
Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920–1940, 90 IOWA L. REV.
1011, 1019–20 (2005) (discussing the growth of chain stores in the early 1900s); Friday Afternoon
Session, May 22, 1964, supra note 3, at 358 (comments of Dean William L. Prosser) (“[T]he little corner
shop, the little grocery store. Gentlemen, that is no longer the retailer of today to any very great
extent. The retailer is Safeway Stores, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, National Stores, a
large chain.”).
47 See CHESTER H. LIEBS, MAIN STREET TO MIRACLE MILE: AMERICAN ROADSIDE ARCHITECTURE
117–35 (1995) (discussing the emergence and eventual dominance of supermarkets in the food-retail
business); CONSUMERS’ PROTECTION AND INTEREST PROGRAM: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO CONSUMERS’ PROTECTION AND INTEREST PROGRAM, H.R. DOC.
NO. 364, at 2 (1962) (observing that “[t]he typical supermarket before World War II stocked about
1,500 separate food items – an impressive figure by any standard. But today it carries over 6,000,” and
“The housewife is called upon to be an amateur electrician, mechanic, chemist, toxicologist, dietician,
and mathematician—but she is rarely furnished the information she needs to perform these tasks
proficiently.”).
48 See STRASSER, supra note 44, at 203–215, 222, 248–51 (discussing this trend).
49 See, e.g., Lester W. Feezer, Manufacturer’s Liability for Injuries Caused by His Products, 37 MICH. L. REV. 1,
3 (1938) (discussing the effect of changed circumstances on the equities of products liability); Robert
W. Miller, Liability of a Manufacturer for Harm Done by a Product, 3 SYR. L. REV. 106, 106 (1951) (“case
law before the advent of radio, television, assembly line production, modem packing methods,
mechanical refrigeration, high speed transportation and current legislation may or may not be in point
in modern litigation.”).
50 Several judges would reference these developments when contemplating reform in the productsliability context. E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 69 A.2d 161, 180–81 (N.J. 1960);
Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399, 402 (N.Y. 1962).
51 David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955, 965–66 (2007); R.D.
Hursh, Annotation, Privity of Contract as Essential to Recovery in Negligence Action Against Manufacturer or Seller
of Product Alleged to Have Caused Injury, 74 A.L.R. 2d 1111, 1128 (1961). While MacPherson involved
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these jurisdictions, courts continued to require privity of contract between a plaintiff
and the defendant(s) when these plaintiffs brought negligence claims that involved
products that were not “reasonably certain to place and limb in peril when
negligently made.”52 But these same courts softened this requirement through a fairly
broad construction of the “reasonably certain” standard.53 Beginning in the 1940s,
some states went further, and rejected the privity requirement in all products cases
sounding in negligence, regardless of the nature of the product involved.54
The resulting upswell in cases led to some doctrinal refinement, with clearer
distinctions being drawn between different types of negligence claims involving
defective products. In addition to the negligent construction and testing at issue in
MacPherson, plaintiffs could and did allege negligence in product design,55 negligent
failures to warn,56 and otherwise inadequate warnings.57 Design and warning claims
remained relatively uncommon, however, through the 1950s.58

liability to an ultimate purchaser, later cases extended its rule to non-purchaser third parties. WILLIAM
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 84 (2d ed. 1955).
52 PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 51, at § 84; Hursh, supra note 51, at 1180–
83 (listing cases).
53 Id. at 1128 (“The imminently dangerous product exception to the privity requirement is an
exceedingly broad one, covering a wide range of products.”).
54 In 1946, Massachusetts became the first state to make this leap. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d
693 (Mass. 1946). A 1961 American Law Reports annotation identified Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Tennessee, and Wisconsin as states where the state courts had generally
rejected a privity requirement in products cases sounding in negligence. Hursh, supra note 51, at 1192–
1203.
55 E.g., Kieffer v. Blue Seal Chemical Co., 196 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1952); Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg.
Co., 88 N.E. 1063 (N.Y. 1909); Torgeson v. Schultz, 84 N.E. 956 (N.Y. 1909); Coakley v. PrentissWabers Stove Co. 195 N.W. 388, 392 (Wis. 1923). See also R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Liability of
Manufacturer or Seller for Injury Caused by Household and Domestic Machinery, Appliances, Furnishings, and
Equipment, 80 A.L.R.2d 598, 611 (1961) (“The manufacturer is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care in adopting a safe plan or design for his product.”). On this issue, section 398 of the Restatement
of Torts, published in 1934, provides:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous
for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he
should expect to use the chattel lawfully or to be in the vicinity of its probable use
for bodily harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of
a safe plan or design.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 398 (1934).
56 See Hardy Cross Dillard & Harris Hart, II, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41
VA. L. REV. 145 (1955) (discussing this type of claim). For a discussion of failure-to-warn claims in the
pre-MacPherson era, see Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865, 871–72 (8th Cir. 1903).
57 E.g., Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. McMath’s Administrator, 146 S. W. 770 (Ky. App. 1912); Farley v.
Edward E. Tower Co., 171 N.E. 639 (Mass. 1930); Hartmon v. Nat’l Heater Co., 60 N.W.2d 804
(Minn. 1953); Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 49 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1944), aff’d, 294 N.Y. 680 (1945). See also
R.D. Hursh, Liability of Manufacturer or Seller for Injury Caused by Household and Domestic Machinery,
Appliances, Furnishings, and Equipment, supra note 55, at 612 (“A manufacturer, in furnishing instruction
with respect to the use of his product, must exercise care to assure that the instructions are adequate
to protect users from harm.”); A.G.S., Duty of Manufacturer or Seller to Warn of Latent Dangers Incident to
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3.

Escola, Warranty, and the Rise of Strict Products Liability in Tort

Even after the MacPherson reform, a sense remained that negligence law could
not adequately address all of the problems presented by defective products.59 It
remained difficult for plaintiffs in some of these cases to prove that any particular
party in the product-supply chain had failed to exercise due care,60 and the devices
that courts were adopting to avoid these problems struck some observers as
needlessly circuitous.61 Frustrated by these shortcomings, some critics lobbied for a
strict-liability approach toward products cases. In the first edition of his Handbook of
the Law of Torts treatise, published in 1941, William Prosser related the case for the
imposition of strict liability upon the manufacturers of defective products. Prosser
noted that “in recent years” there had been:
an increased feeling that social policy demands that the burden of
accidental injuries caused by defective chattels be placed upon the
producer, since he is best able to distribute the risk to the general
public by means of prices and insurance. Added to this is the
difficulty of proving negligence with the aid of res ipsa loquitur,
together with the wastefulness and uncertainty of a series of warranty
actions carrying liability back through retailer and jobber to the
original maker, the practice of reputable manufacturers to stand
behind their goods as good business policy, and a recognition that
the intermediate seller is usually a mere conduit to market the
product. There is an obvious argument that in the public interest the
consumer is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of

Article as a Class, as Distinguished from Duty with Respect to Defects in Particular Article, 86 A.L.R. 947 (1933)
(collecting cases).
58 See Harold A. Katz, Negligence in Design a Developing Area of Product Liability Law, NACCA ELEVENTH
ANN. CONVENTION 1957 at 216, 217 (1958) (“Negligence based on ‘failure to exercise reasonable
care in the adoption of a safe plan or design’ is the field of product liability law to which least
attention has been directed.”); Harold A. Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of
Passenger Cars, 69 HARV. L. REV. 863, 871 (1956) (observing that lawyers had not yet devoted
significant attention to flaws in automobile design).
59 Feezer, supra note 49, at 3 (“[t]he legal problems arising from the function of manufacturers in the
modern social organization cannot be handled adequately on the basis of negligence alone. Proof of
negligence is impossible in many cases where human nature instinctively senses obligation.”).
60 Gerald A. Gleason, Investigation, Preparation and Defense of Products Liability Cases, 20 INS. COUNSEL J.
114, 117 (1953) (“Negligence on the part of the manufacturer is often very difficult to prove.”);
William L. Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1116–17
(1960).
61 E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 442–43 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 83 (1941).
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some one [sic], and that the producer, practically and morally, is the
one to provide it.62
Three years later, California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor would
echo these arguments in his concurring opinion in the Escola case.63 Traynor also
emphasized that because of mass-marketing trends, “[t]he consumer no longer has
means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product.”64
In lobbying for strict liability in tort, Prosser noted that extension of the law
of implied warranty represented “[t]he device most readily at hand to accomplish this
result.”65 Indeed, breach-of-warranty claims would provide the principal vehicle
through which plaintiffs pressed products cases through the 1950s.66 A products case
potentially implicated an express warranty,67 an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose,68 and an implied warranty of merchantability.69 The last of these
warranties gave rise to the most claims.70

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, at § 83.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d at 440–44 (Traynor, J., concurring). Another
jurist, Karl Llewellyn, thought along similar lines. A 1941 draft of the Revised Uniform Sales Act
prepared by Llewellyn contained a section 16-B, titled “Obligation to Consumer and to Dealer for
Non-Apparent Dangerous Defect,” that would have made manufacturers liable to remote buyers
injured in person, property, or otherwise as a result of a defect in the manufacturer’s goods. A
comment to this section provided that the term “defect” was intended to be broad enough to include
“defects of manufacture or design, adulteration, presence of foreign substances, and indeed the whole
range of hidden danger, when the net product appears and ought to be safe to use in the ordinary
manner, but is not.” John W. Wade, Tort Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the
U.C.C., 48 MO. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (1983) (quoting the draft and discussing the circumstances
surrounding its preparation). When placed up for debate, this section did not meet with a rousing
reception, and Llewllyn abandoned it. Id. at 16–20.
64 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
65 PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, at § 83.
66 Gillam, supra note 42, at 124 (“The consumer’s rights against the retailer now are stated principally
in terms of warranty rather than in terms of negligence.”).
67 Per the Uniform Sales Act, “Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the
goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the
buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of
the value of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller’s opinion only
shall be construed as a warranty.” Uniform Sales Act § 12. The Uniform Sales Act was adopted by 34
states between 1906 and 1947, making it the operative law in a majority of the states. Donald J.
Smythe, Transaction Costs, Neighborhood Effects, and the Diffusion of the Uniform Sales Act, 1906–1947, 4
REV. OF LAW & ECON. 341, 341 (2008).
68 Under the Uniform Sales Act, “Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on
the seller’s skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.” Uniform Sales Act § 15.
69 Per the Uniform Sales Act, “Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in
goods of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be of a merchantable quality.” Uniform Sales Act §15.
70 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER
62
63
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Recovery under a warranty theory could be simpler or more complicated
than a lawsuit cast in negligence. Plaintiffs could obtain relief for a breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability by showing that the goods they purchased from
the defendant had not been “reasonably fit for the ordinary uses to which goods of
[their] kind are put,”71 without also having to establish that the defect owed to the
seller’s negligence. Liability under an implied-warranty theory was therefore “strict”
in a manner that negligence liability was not. But there were trade-offs. Among them,
there existed important defenses to a warranty claim that did not exist in the
negligence context. Warranties could be disclaimed by the seller as part of a contract
for sale,72 and plaintiffs had to provide the defendant with reasonable notice of any
breach.73
Of at least equal importance, under prevailing privity rules, only the person
who had purchased the goods at issue could claim warranty protections, and only
against the immediate seller.74 This privity barrier proved more resilient in the
warranty context than it had been in negligence cases.75 Although it was widely
understood that the concept of an implied warranty had a historical and logical
connection to public-policy precepts similar to those associated with tort liability,76 it
remained that without some contract, there could be no warranty.77 This connection
led to a conflation of the two concepts, with courts declining to extend warranties to
remote (downstream) purchasers, or to strangers to a purchasing contract, such as
THE UNIFORM SALES ACT §§

229, 232–34 (1909).
William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 130 (1943).
72 Per section 71 of the Uniform Sales Act, “Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a
contract to sell or a sale of implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement or
by the course of dealing between the parties, or by custom, if the custom be such as to bind both
parties to the contract or the sale.” Uniform Sales Act § 71. See also Fleming James, Jr., Products
Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 192, 210–12 (1955) (discussing the law of disclaimers); Prosser, The Implied
Warranty of Merchantable Quality, supra note 71, at 157–67 (same).
73 Under section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act, “if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give
notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer
knows, or ought to know of such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor.” Uniform Sales Act
§ 49. See also James, supra note 72, at 196–98 (discussing the notice requirement); Donald P. Newell,
Notice Requirement in Warranty Actions Involving Personal Injury, 51 CAL. L. REV. 586 (1963) (same).
74 WILLISTON, supra note 70, at § 244.
75 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 28.16 (1956). See also R.D.
Hursh, Annotation, Privity of Contract as Essential to Recovery in Action Based on Theory Other than Negligence,
Against Manufacturer or Seller of Product Alleged to Have Caused Injury, 75 A.L.R.2d 39, 44–45 (1961) (“[t]he
traditional, and still prevailing, view is that privity of contract is indispensable to recovery against the
manufacturer or seller of a product which has caused injury where the defendant’s breach of an
express or implied warranty is asserted.”).
76 See, e.g., PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, § 83 (observing that “the
action for breach of a warranty was originally a tort action”).
77 Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 916, 923 (1964) (“privity—i.e., the
existence of a direct contractual relationship—was a conceptual necessity because the seller’s modem
obligations for defective products developed as a part of the law of contracts.”).
71
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family members or employees of the consumer.78 Even as they paid lip service to the
privity rule, however, courts resorted to a number of stratagems to avoid it. The
various legal fictions they developed toward this purpose,79 which honored the
privity requirement in theory if not in spirit, got the job done but failed to satisfy
from a doctrinal perspective.80
The first batch of outright rejections of a privity requirement for an impliedwarranty claim appeared in cases involving tainted or unwholesome food.81 Starting
with a Washington Supreme Court decision in 1913,82 many states carved out an
exception to the prevailing privity rule for warranty claims premised on rotten or
adulterated food products. This deviation caught on slowly at first. 1941, Prosser
wrote that the majority of jurisdictions still demanded privity of contract between the
plaintiff and defendant in these cases.83 Prosser could have added the word “vast” in
front of “majority,” since only the highest courts of a handful of other states had
joined Washington as of that time.84 But the tide would soon change. A few states—
Texas,85 Florida,86 Oklahoma,87 Louisiana,88 and Minnesota89 (the latter in express
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, at § 83.
One commentator, writing in 1957, identified 29 “fictions, subterfuges, and bold strikes” that courts
had used to avoid the privity bar in warranty suits. Gillam, supra note 42, at 152–55.
80 Id. at 155. See also Mark A. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in DefectiveProduct Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 991 (1966) (stating that the reasoning employed in cases that
employed legal fictions to dodge the privity bar “was never very clear.”). That courts were resorting to
spurious fictions to avoid the privity requirement was far from a secret among judges. See, e.g., Beck v.
Spindler, 99 N.W.2d 670, 682 (Minn. 1959) (“It would seem that some other courts have tried to find
a way of permitting recovery without expressly discarding the idea of privity.”).
81 See Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 60, at 1103–06.
82 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633, 636 (Wash. 1913). Earlier decisions had applied a similar rule,
but under the authority of state-specific pure food and drug laws. E.g., Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil
& Mfg. Co., 119 N.W. 428, 429–30 (Minn. 1909).
83 PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, at § 83. Prosser noted, however, that
“[t]he more recent cases . . . have shown a definite tendency in that direction. It seems probable that
this will be the law of the future, and that the end of the next quarter of a century will find the
principle generally accepted.” Id.
84 Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd., 93 P.2d 799, 804 (Cal. 1939); Davis v Van Camp Packing Co.,
176 N.W. 382, 390 (Iowa 1920); Swengel v F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 77 P.2d 930, 935 (Kan.
1938); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v Lyons, 111 So. 305, 307 (Miss. 1927); Kelley v John R. Daily Co.,
181 P. 326, 329 (Mont. 1919); Catani v Swift & Co., 95 A. 931, 932 (Pa. 1915). Also, an appellate
court in Ohio had upheld the privity requirement, but cast the consumer as a third-party beneficiary
of the contract for sale between the manufacturer and the retailer. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 161
N.E. 557, 559 (Ohio. App. 1928). Arizona appears to have implicitly rejected a privity requirement in
Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 25 P.2d 162, 166 (Ariz. 1933), but in a 1957 decision that formally interred the
privity requirement in food cases, the Arizona Supreme Court said that the privity issue “had never
before been presented to this court for decision.” Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 317 P.2d
1094, 1096 (Ariz. 1957).
85 Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828, 834 (Tex. 1942).
86 Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 19 So.2d 313, 316 (Fla. 1944).
87 Griffin v Asbury, 165 P.2d 822, 826 (Okla. 1946)
88 Le Blanc v Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 So.2d 873, 875 (La. 1952).
78
79
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warranty cases only)—foreswore a privity element in food cases during the 1940s
and the early 1950s. And then, the floodgates opened. Between 1957 and 1961, the
supreme courts of eight states90 all rejected or significantly pared back the privity rule
in warranty cases involving food products.91
The post-World War II era also saw a few courts chip away at the privity
barrier in warranty cases that involved products other than food. Some of these cases
waved away a privity requirement where the product at issue was somehow
analogous to food. For example, the privity requirement was lifted in a few cases
involving defective animal feed,92 “apparently on the bald theory that food is food.”93
Some of the few courts to confront the issue also declined to require privity of
contract in cases involving personal-hygiene products, analogized to food on the
ground that they were all used directly upon, if not inside, the person.94 The
Michigan Supreme Court would go a step further in 1958. The plaintiff in Spence v.
Three Rivers Building and Masonry Supply, Inc.,95 owned a cottage built with cinderblocks
supplied by the defendant and sold to a contractor hired by the plaintiff. Shortly after
the cottage was built, the blocks started to crack, chip, and decay.96 The plaintiff sued
the manufacturer of the blocks on implied- and express-warranty theories.97 The
court spotted actionable negligence on the facts alleged, but also gainsaid any privity
requirement for recovery in warranty, as it saw “no reason in logic or sound law why
recovery in [warranty cases] should be confined to . . . food and related cases and
denied in all others.”98

Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 54 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Minn. 1952).
Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 317 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ariz. 1957); Tiffin v Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co.162 N.E.2d 406, 411 (Ill. 1959); Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 109
N.W.2d 918, 921–22 (Mich. 1961); Midwest Game Co. v. M. F. A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547, 550
(Mo. 1959); Asher v Coca Cola Bottling Co. 112 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Neb. 1961); Greenberg v. Lorenz,
173 N.E.2d 773, 775–76 (N.Y. 1961) (rejecting the privity requirement, at least when the plaintiff was
a member of the purchaser’s household); Schneider v Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 822, 825 (Utah 1958);
Swift & Co. v. Wells, 110 S.E.2d 203, 208–09 (Va. 1959).
91 Connecticut, meanwhile, abandoned the privity rule in warranty cases involving prepackaged
consumer goods. Hamon v. Digliani, 174 A.2d 294, 296 (Conn. 1961).
92 E.g., Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Mo. 1959).
93 Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 60, at 1111.
94 See Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314, 318 (8th Cir. 1958) (discussing these cases);
Graham v. Bottenfield’s, Inc., 269 P.2d 413, 418 (Kan. 1954); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,
139 N.E.2d 871, 886 (Oh. 1957).
95 90 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1958).
96 Id. at 874.
97 Id. at 875.
98 Id. at 878.
89
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Through the 1950s, decisions such as Spence were few and far between.99
Nevertheless, these rulings cheered a cluster of academics who had spent the past
several years advocating for strict liability to the consumer. Among them, Yale Law
School Professor Fleming James advocated for the “enterprise liability” of
manufacturers in law-review articles and in his influential 1956 treatise, co-authored
with his colleague, Professor Fowler Harper.100 William Prosser, who had started the
strict-liability ball rolling almost two decades before, wrote in 1960 that Spence and a
handful of similar decisions collected from other jurisdictions evidenced a positive
“Trend” toward strict liability to the consumer.101
Almost simultaneously with Prosser’s announcement,102 the New Jersey
Supreme Court handed down Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,103 which rewrote the
law of warranty in that state. Henningsen involved an new Plymouth automobile,
bought by a husband for his wife.104 Shortly after the vehicle’s purchase, while Mrs.
Henningsen was driving it, she heard a cracking noise under the hood.105 Her
Plymouth veered off the road, injuring Mrs. Henningsen and seriously damaging the
car.106 She and her husband sued both the dealer from which Mr. Henningsen had
purchased the car, as well as the automobile’s manufacturer, Chrysler. The trial court
threw out the plaintiffs’ negligence claim, but allowed their implied-warranty claim to
go to the jury.107 After deliberations, the jury returned with a $30,000 plaintiffs’
verdict—$26,000 to Mrs. Henningsen and $4,000 for her husband.108 On appeal, the
Henningsen defendants attacked the trial court’s decision to allow the plaintiffs’
warranty claims to proceed, since Mrs. Henningsen had not purchased the vehicle
See also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501, 505 (10th Cir. 1959) (rejecting a privity
requirement for an implied-warranty claim involving an exploding tire).
100 The most well-known of James’s works on products liability are Fleming James, Jr., Products
Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44 (1955); James, supra note 72; and the relevant portions of his treatise, 2
HARPER & JAMES, JR., supra note 75, at §§ 28.1–28.33. A detailed review of James’s scholarship, as it
pertains to products liability, appears at Priest, supra note 6, at 471–83, 501–03.
101 Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 60, at 1114. While Prosser is
today the most celebrated of these prophets, the general trend toward greater liability on the part of
manufacturers and sellers was quite obvious to many observers of the time. E.g., Paul Oberst, Torts, in
1959 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 442, 459 (Albert H. Garretson, ed., 1960) (“As might be expected the
year saw continued changes in the direction of thrusting the risk of injury by defective products upon
those most able to absorb and distribute this burden.”).
102 As sleuthed by Priest, supra note 6, at 506–07.
103 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). For a thorough retelling and examination of the Henningsen case, drawing
from original court documents, see Jay N. Feinman & Caitlin Edwards, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc. (1960): Promoting Product Safety by Protecting Consumers of Defective Goods, in COURTING JUSTICE: TEN
NEW JERSEY CASES THAT SHOOK THE NATION 5–22 (Paul L. Tractenberg, ed. 2013).
104 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d at 73.
105 Id. at 75.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Feinman & Edwards, supra note 103, at 8.
99
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herself, and neither plaintiff had direct contractual relations with Chrysler.109 The
New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously rejected these arguments, in a striking
renunciation of the privity requirement.110 For good measure, Henningsen held that the
defendants’ written disclaimer of warranties was void as contrary to public policy.111
The legal community appreciated the path-breaking nature of the Henningsen
precedent, “the first unequivocal holding by the highest court of a state that privity is
unnecessary to warranty liability.”112 Other states, most notably New York, soon
followed Henningsen’s lead in eliminating or paring back privity requirements for
warranty claims.113 Within three years, however, Henningsen had been trumped by the
California Supreme Court’s Greenman decision,114 which shifted the focus of
products-liability reform from warranty to “pure” tort law.
Greenman, which involved an allegedly defective “ShopSmith” workbench,
was brought as a negligence and warranty case. The plaintiff received a judgment in
his favor, which the Court of Appeal affirmed over the manufacturer’s argument that
the plaintiff had not given timely notice of the defect.115 Upon granting review, the
California Supreme Court endorsed the Court of Appeal’s reasoning on the warranty
issue.116 Though this conclusion sufficed to resolve the case, the Court further
opined that “[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a
Brief for Defendant, Bloomfield Motors, Inc., as Cross-Respondent and Appellant at 23–24,
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (No. A-50); Brief for Defendant, Chrysler
Corporation as Cross-Respondent and Appellant at 13–16, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161
A.2d 69 (1960) (No. A-50).
110 Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 84, 99–100.
111 Id. at 95, 97.
112 Recent Case: Sales-Implied Warranties-Implied Warranty of Merchantability Renders Manufacturer Liable to
Buyer’s Wife Despite Disclaimer Clause and Absence of Privity of Contract – Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.
(N.J. 1960), 74 HARV. L. REV. 630, 630 (1961).
113 E.g., Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 353 P.2d 575, 581 (Cal. 1960); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 1961); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
191 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 1963); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399,
404 (N.Y. 1962); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 173 N.E.2d 773, 776 (N.Y. 1962). See also General Motors
Corp. v. Dodson, 338 S.W.2d 655, 660–61 (Ten. App. 1960) (allowing a lawsuit to proceed against the
manufacturer of an automobile, even when purchased through a dealer, as “the jury could have found
that [the manufacturer] was the actual person or entity with whom plaintiffs were dealing, and [the
dealer] was a conduit or subterfuge by which General Motors tried to exempt itself from liability to
the consumers who are the plaintiffs.”). Federal courts were even more aggressive in attacking the
privity requirement during this span. See, e.g., Deveny v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 319 F.2d 124, 130
(2d Cir. 1963); Bowles v. Zimmer Manuf. Co., 277 F.2d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 1960); Chapman v. Brown,
198 F.Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff’d, Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); McQuaide
v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F.Supp. 252, 254-55 (D. Conn. 1960).
114 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
115 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 23 Cal.Rptr 282, 286 (Cal. App. 1962), aff’d, 377 P.2d 897
(Cal. 1963).
116 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d at 900.
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defect that causes injury to a human being.”117 The Greenman court only cursorily
canvassed the policy motivations for its adoption of strict liability, stating that these
reasons had been “fully articulated” elsewhere.118 The court devoted more effort to
explaining why tort, rather than warranty, represented the optimal doctrinal solution
to the problems presented by defective products.119 Notwithstanding the efforts that
had been made to ground warranty in tort law,120 the Greenman court regarded
warranty as still too closely tethered to the law of sales to provide an adequate basis
for an obligation imposed for public-policy reasons.121
Notwithstanding Greenman, no other state adopted strict products liability
grounded squarely in tort prior to the promulgation of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts Section 402A.122 As prepared by Prosser, the reporter for the Second
Restatement, this section went through a series of drafts that endorsed strict liability
for an ever-expanding universe of products. A 1961 draft would have applied strict
liability only to sales of food products.123 One year later, Prosser revised the
provision to extend strict liability to “products for intimate bodily use.”124 Finally, in
1964 Prosser tendered to the American Law Institute (ALI) a provision that allowed
the “ultimate user or consumer”125 to proceed in tort, on a strict liability basis, against
the seller of “any product in defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user.”126 The blackletter of Section 402A was accompanied by comments “a”
through “q,” which provided an atlas to the frontier opened up by the new rule.
These comments did not resolve every conceivable products issue that might arise—
far from it—but they did address enough of the high-profile fact patterns of the era
(involving products such as tobacco (at comment i)127 and vaccines (at comment
Id. at 900.
Id. at 901.
119 Id.
120 See, e.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399, 401 n.2 (N.Y. 1962)
(discussing this connection).
121 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d at 901 (“rules defining and governing
warranties that were developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be
invoked to govern the manufacturer’s liability to those injured by their defective products unless those
rules also serve the purposes for which such liability is imposed.”).
Id. Cf. Gillam, supra note 42, at 131 (“The modern law generally regards warranty as contractual in
nature.”).
122 Some courts had cited to tentative drafts of Section 402A well before the section’s publication in
finished form. E.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 26 (5th Cir. 1963);
Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 114 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Wis. 1962).
123 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 6 1961).
124 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 7 1962).
125 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 10 1964).
126 Id.
127 At issue in Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963); Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962); and Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 69 (Fla.
117
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k))128 to assure would-be adopters that strict products liability, though a step forward,
did have some boundaries. The ALI approved Prosser’s handiwork in May 1964,129
and Section 402A was formally published a year later.130
In the years that followed, courts (and a few legislatures) rushed to adopt a
tort-based theory of strict products liability.131 By 1976, 42 states and the District of
Columbia had jumped aboard the bandwagon,132 a progression so rapid that it
1963).
128 This provision may have been sparked by then-recent litigation over the defective Cutter polio
vaccine. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 6 Cal.Rptr. 320 (Cal. App. 1960).
129 Friday Afternoon Session, May 22, 1964, supra note 3, at 375.
130 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
131 Bespeaking judicial enthusiasm for the theory, several courts (such as Greenman) adopted a tort
basis for strict liability under circumstances where it was either unnecessary to the case or arguably not
properly presented for the court’s consideration. See Herbert W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 715–17 (1970) (discussing this
phenomenon).
132 In alphabetical order, these jurisdictions (with the accompanying decision or legislative act that
adopted strict products liability in tort) are Alabama (Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So.2d 134
(Ala. 1976)); Alaska (Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969)); Arizona
(O.S. Stapley Co v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248 (Ariz. 1968)); Arkansas (An Act to Impose Liability for Injury
and Damages Done in Certain Circumstances by Defective Products; and for Other Purposes, Act
111, 1973 Ark. Acts. 331); Colorado (Hugel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975));
Connecticut (Garthwait v. Burgio, 216 A.2d 189 (Dec. 30, 1965)); D.C. (Cottom v. McGuire Funeral
Service, Inc., 262 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1970); Florida (West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80
(Fla. 1976)); Georgia (Liability of Manufacturers and Sellers of Personal Property to Users, No. 1085,
1968 Ga. Laws 1166); Hawaii (Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (May 26, 1970));
Idaho (Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 518 P.2d 857 (Id. 1974)); Illinois (Suvada v. White Motor Co.,
210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1965)); Indiana (Ayr-Way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, 300 N.E.2d 335 (Ind. 1973));
Iowa (Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970)); Kansas (Brooks
v. Dietz, 545 P.2d 1104 (Kan. 1976)); Kentucky (Dealers Trans. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co. 402
S.W.3d 441 (Ky. 1965)); Louisiana (Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 250 So.2d 754 (La. 1971));
Maine (An Act Relating to Liability for Physical Harm to Users, Consumers or Bystanders from
Defective Goods or Products, ch. 466, 1973 Me. Laws 822); Maryland (Phipps v. General Motors
Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976)); Minnesota (McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn.
1967)); Mississippi (State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966)); Missouri (Keener v.
Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W. 2d 362 (Mo. 1969)); Montana (Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor
Sales, Inc. 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973)); Nebraska (Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.W.2d 601 (Neb.
1971)); Nevada (Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 135 (Nev. 1970)); New Hampshire (Buttrick
v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111 (N.H. 1969)); New Jersey (Santor v. A&M
Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 350 (N.J. 1965)); New Mexico (Stang v. Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732 (May
26, 1972)); New York (Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1973)); North Dakota (Johnson v.
Am. Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974)); Ohio (Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 218 N.E.2d
185 (Ohio 1966)); Oklahoma (Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974));
Oregon (Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467 (Ore. 1967)); Pennsylvania (Webb v. Zem, 220 A.2d
853 (Pa. 1966)); Rhode Island (Ritter v. Narrangansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255 ((R.I. 1971)); South
Carolina (An Act to Provide for the Strict Liability of a Seller of a Defective and Unreasonably
Dangerous Product Which Causes Physical Harm to a User or Consumer or to His Property, No.
1184, 1974 S.C. Acts 2782); South Dakota (Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973));
Tennessee (Ford Motor Co v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966)); Texas (McKisson v. Sales
Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967)); Vermont (Zaleskie v. Joyce, 333 A.2d 110 (Vt. 1975));
Washington (Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 452 P.2d 729 (Wash. 1969)); and Wisconsin (Dippel v. Sciano,
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amazed even some judges who joined in the movement.133 Utah and West Virginia
straggled into the fold in 1979.134 In 1986, Wyoming became the last state to date to
follow the trend.135 As will be discussed in more detail later, Delaware,
Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia remain holdouts, to a degree.
These five states continue to couch their (enhanced) consumer protections in the
language of warranty.136
As a postscript, once courts adopted strict products liability, it became
apparent that the concept required further elaboration as applied to different types of
claims. The 1970s through the early 1980s represented strict products liability’s
awkward teenage years, in which courts sought to define the parameters of the new
rule.137 Today, the brand of “strict liability” applicable to a case depends on whether
the defect involved constitutes a “manufacturing defect,” “design defect,” or
“warning defect.” Only as to the first of these—defined as a defect whereby a
product’s design does not conform to a manufacturer’s intentions138—is liability truly
“strict.” The general principles most jurisdictions now apply to design and warning
claims echo negligence rules, albeit with a paramount focus upon the qualities of the
product itself, not necessarily the actions of the human agents who produced it.139
B. The History of Strict Products Liability: Prevailing Themes
So goes a reasonably formulaic retelling of how strict products liability came
into being. Some form of this story represents the archetypal tale of doctrinal
evolution in tort law, probably because of its affirmational, functionalist, and familiar
nature. The narrative details a steady progression of the law, in synch with broader
social trends. Marking this evolution are series of touchstone cases, two of which
were written by the most prominent state-court judges of their respective eras.
Academics also made significant contributions to the movement, with the most
155 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1967)).
133 See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 500 (Minn. 1967) (commenting upon the
“remarkable shift” toward adoption of strict products liability).
134 Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979); West Virginia Morningstar v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W.Va. 1979).
135 Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986).
136 Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Maryland, Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 975–76 (Del.1980); Jacobs v. Yamaha
Motor Corp., U.S.A., 649 N.E.2d 758, 763 n.6 (Mass. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1.1 (2011);
Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 57 n.4 (Va. 1988). For a
discussion of the approaches these states (and the other holdout, Michigan) have taken to products
liability, see DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 281–85 (2d ed. 2008).
137 See JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 29–34 (2005); Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability
Law, supra note 51, at 978–79.
138 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998) (defining a manufacturing defect).
139 See id. (defining design and warning defects). See also James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence
Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377, 384 (2002) (“In the areas involving generic product risks,
common law liability of manufacturers has always been, and will always be, based on fault.”).
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famous torts professor of all having the greatest impact. This narrative, in short,
reads like a history of a war fought over ideas, in which the good guys won.
MacPherson, Henningsen, and Greenman play the same roles in this narrative as the
battles of Shiloh, Gettysburg, and Atlanta do in histories of the Civil War, with
Cardozo, Traynor, and Prosser standing in for Grant, Sherman, and Lincoln. With its
top-down approach and march toward the inevitable, despite some setbacks and
delays along the way, the conventional history of strict products liability thus
dovetails nicely with how people have been trained to receive histories generally.
That said, this story also contains some riddles. Among them, this narrative
begs the question of why strict products liability, after being under consideration for
so long, was adopted so quickly during the 1960s and 1970s. There exist two basic
explanations for this pattern. One account argues that various attributes of 1960s
and 1970s culture disposed the judges of that era to adopt strict products liability.
The other assigns primary responsibility to a cadre of academics who, from the
1940s through the 1960s, provided the intellectual breakthroughs that made strict
products liability respectable.
The first of these explanations lays strict products liability at the doorstep of
the activist frisson of the 1960s and 1970s and its impact upon judges. Reflecting on
this atmosphere, Gary Schwartz has written:
[I]n expanding liability [during the 1960s and 1970s] modern judges
drew upon tort law’s negligence tradition, upon the fairness and
deterrence rationales embedded in that tradition, and upon the
modern loss-distribution rationale, which could easily enough be
linked with that tradition. Furthermore, those judges were
emboldened both by the problem-solving judicial activism of the
Warren Court and by the more general reform-minded public-policy
discourse of the 1960s and 1970s. In this latter respect modern tort
law can be regarded as one of those ambitious programs initiated
during the Great Society and then confirmed and further
institutionalized during the 1970s.140
As directed toward products liability, the prevailing sense was
that major American corporations—and in particular, the Big Three
automakers—were economic colossi that could easily bear whatever
burdens might be imposed on them by way of regulation and liability.
A second feature of public opinion was that these corporations
should not be held in high respect; indeed, they should be frequently
Schwartz, supra note 7, at 619. See also Mark Geistfeld, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.: Strict Products
Liability Unbound, in TORTS STORIES, supra note 35, 229, 241–42 (discussing this view).
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distrusted. . . . During the 1960s, the consumer movement was
gaining force; this movement portrayed innocent consumers as
needing strong protection from manufacturers, which frequently treat
consumers in shabby ways. . . . The willingness of courts in the late
1960s to impose strong liabilities on major corporations (especially
product manufacturers) was certainly facilitated by this discrediting of
corporations that was occurring in the public outlook.141
An alternative explanation for the adoption of strict products liability
identifies legal academics as a singularly determinative influence. George Priest’s
article The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of
Modern Tort Law represents the leading work in this genre. Priest discounts the
significance of “contemporary social currents” in the adoption of strict products
liability,142 and instead stresses the efforts made by Professors James and Prosser to
lay a doctrinal foundation for strict liability in tort.
As Priest explains (and as summarized earlier, in retelling the conventional
account of strict products liability’s ascendance), throughout the 1940s and 1950s
James devised the basic theoretical framework for “enterprise liability,” a theory of
policy and responsibility that would undergird strict liability to the consumer.143
Prosser later advocated on behalf of strict liability in his scholarship, most famously
in his Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) article in the Yale Law Journal,
and steered the American Law Institute toward a full embrace of strict products
liability through the drafts of Section 402A that he prepared.144 Per Priest’s
explanation, James brought passion and persistence to the debate over products
liability, while Prosser contributed catchy prose, a willingness to exaggerate,145 good
timing,146 and an unparalleled bully pulpit. Their combined efforts did the job. In
Priest’s version of the story, once enterprise liability gained a consensus among
academics, “[j]udicial implementation followed almost immediately.”147
Priest makes three specific assertions as to why academic efforts primed the
nation’s judges to adopt strict liability with “extraordinary” speed.148 First, he argues
Schwartz, supra note 7, at 615.
Priest, supra note 6, at 464.
143 For an overview of enterprise liability as a positive theory of tort law, see John C.P. Goldberg,
Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 537–44 (2003).
144 Priest, supra note 6, at 512–14.
145 Id. at 514.
146 As Priest observes, id. at 506, Prosser’s Assault on the Citadel article arrived in libraries and judicial
chambers only a few months after the New Jersey Supreme Court issued its path-breaking decision in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
147 Priest, supra note 6, at 464.
148 Id. at 518.
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that “the entire world of legal academics and thirty years of accumulated writing
supported the change.”149 Second, he infers that the thrust of this scholarship
resonated with the personal experiences of judges.150 Third, according to Priest, strict
products liability, as framed by James and Prosser, spread apace because of “its
exceptional sophistication in comparison with extant theories of negligence and
warranty law and the link that it provide[d] to a broader understanding of the judicial
purpose.”151 Unlike the stodgy principles of negligence and warranty law,
“[e]nterprise liability theory . . . appointed the judge an agent of the modern state.” 152
The doctrinal shift “allowed judges to aid the poor” and “adjust production decisions
in the economy” such that they, too, could participate in the hydraulic adjustments
of modern governance.153
The problem with these explanations is not that either is wrong, but that they
do not tell the entire story. For one thing, neither account, nor the standard history
with which they work, considers the possible influence of plaintiffs and their counsel
in the drive toward strict products liability. True, it is impossible to isolate every
trend or event that conceivably might have contributed toward this shift.154 But
among these alternative or additional contributions, the absence of plaintiffs and
their lawyers from the prevailing narratives seems most striking. After all, these
individuals represented the ground troops in the revolution. Had plaintiffs not come
to appreciate products-related injuries as tortious, or had lawyers not been willing to
take their cases, courts would have lacked the raw material with which to innovate. It
is easy to take these lawsuits as a given, at least if one assumes a receptive judiciary.
But this assumption is not necessarily accurate. There exist plenty of potentially

Id.
Id.
151 Id. at 518–19.
152 Id. at 519.
153 Id.
154 For an example of an arguably important indirect influence, between 1957 and 1980, the number
of states claiming intermediate appellate courts tripled, rising from 11 to 33. Daryl R. Fair, State
Intermediate Appellate Courts: An Introduction, 24 W. POL. Q. 415, 415 (1971); Carl Norberg, Some Second
and Third Thoughts on an Intermediate Court of Appeals, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 93, 94 n.1 (1981). The
creation of these courts conferred upon more state supreme courts the freedom of discretionary
review, as opposed to mandatory jurisdiction over their torts caseload. This transition may have made
the judges on state supreme courts more interested in molding public policy with their decisions. See
Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961, 983 (1978) (“[The]
increasing discretion and diminishing caseload implied corresponding changes in the function of the
supreme courts. It suggested an emerging societal consensus that state supreme courts should not be
passive, reactive bodies . . . but that these courts should be policy-makers and, at least in some cases,
legal innovators.”).
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viable claims that never gain broad acceptance, either because plaintiffs do not
recognize them, or lawyers do not consider them worth their while.155
Likewise, neither explanation spends much time considering prosaic, nutsand-bolts reasons why judges may have adopted strict products liability. Writing in
1960, Prosser could identify only a few substantial problems with the application of
negligence law in products cases. “Where the action is against the manufacturer of
the product,” Prosser acknowledged, “an honest estimate might very well be that
there is not one case in a hundred in which strict liability would result in recovery
where negligence does not.”156 To Prosser, negligence “[broke] down” only when the
negligent manufacturer was insolvent, unknown, or unavailable for process, and a
plaintiff’s suit against a middleman retailer or wholesaler would fail either because
these entities had no duty to inspect the defective goods, or because a reasonable
inspection would not have revealed the defect.157 In the abstract, these concerns
seem like a thin premise for such an important change in the law, particularly when
modestly broadened warranty protections against the retailer might have provided an
adequate remedy. But perhaps there existed prominent case tropes of Prosser’s era
that highlighted the problems he spotted, and possibly other difficulties with the
application of standard negligence and warranty principles. If so, the clarity with
which these cases framed the case for strict products liability may have intrigued
even hard-headed judges who were generally skeptical about change.
Finally, neither narrative accounts for the continued existence of the five
holdouts against framing strict products liability in the tort verbiage that Prosser and
Traynor prescribed. Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and
Virginia also experienced “the more general reform-minded public-policy discourse
of the 1960s and 1970s.”158 And there exists little indication that these states denied
their judges access to Prosser’s articles, much less the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Yet these states resisted the trend toward strict liability in tort, and opted to work
within the law of warranty instead. Perhaps strict products liability in tort was less
overdetermined than conventional wisdom would suggest.

See Marc Galanter, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 371, 377–78 (1990)
(discussing how claim consciousness (or a lack thereof) among plaintiffs, as well as the interests and
abilities of plaintiffs’ counsel, affect the volume of litigation involving a particular cause of action);
Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1257–60 (2012) (discussing claim consciousness among plaintiffs). For a
critical take on how the profit motives of attorneys can affect the substance of tort law, see LESTER
BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT CONTINGENCY FEES REALLY COST AMERICA (2011).
156 Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 60, at 1114.
157 Id. at 1117.
155
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Schwartz, supra note 7, at 619.
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III. THE POPULIST NARRATIVE: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS
AND THEIR COUNSEL
Thus, notwithstanding how much has been written about strict products
liability, there remain several tales to be told. The first of the hidden histories
concerns how heightened claim consciousness among would-be plaintiffs and an
increasingly well-organized plaintiffs’ bar affected the development and diffusion of
this doctrine. Existing narratives concentrate upon the supply of this doctrinal
innovation by academics and judges. A different perspective would consider the
forces that drove the demand for change among individual claimants and their
lawyers.
A. The Emergence of Claim and Class Consciousness
The sociolegal explanation for strict products liability acknowledges that
popular hostility toward corporations somehow “facilitated” judicial recognition of
this doctrine.159 The discussion below ascribes more agency to the burgeoning
contingent of self-identifying consumers, who as the twentieth century progressed
came to appreciate an ever-greater array of product-related claims.
Consumer movements of various types have appeared throughout American
history. The American Revolution was, in a sense, the most important such
crusade.160 A century later, the pure food and drug campaign drew strength from a
broad base of support among consumers, sickened by accounts of unsanitary
conditions in slaughterhouses and other food processing and distribution facilities.161
The consumer movement that contributed to the strict products-liability revolution
evolved more gradually than had these earlier drives. This awakening originated with
the same trends that caused jurists to reconsider the privity rule in negligence suits:
mass production, the introduction of middlemen and retailers into the supply chain,
enhanced advertising and promotion, and expanded retail showplaces.

Schwartz, supra note 7, at 619.
See T.H. BREEN, THE MARKETPLACE OF REVOLUTION: HOW CONSUMER POLITICS SHAPED
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2004) (discussing the politicization of consumers in the years leading up
to the American Revolution).
161 See generally LORAINE SWAINSTON GOODWIN, THE PURE FOOD, DRINK, AND DRUG CRUSADERS,
1879–1914 (2006). See also LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS
CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 21 (2003) (discussing the Progressives’ identification of
“consumers as a new category of American citizenry.”); STRASSER, supra note 43, at 252–60. Women’s
organizations and magazines directed toward a female audience were particularly involved in this
campaign. See, e.g., Progress, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Feb. 1902, at 154 (discussing the ongoing purefood movement, and the magazine’s role therein).
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In response to these changes, consumers sought out new sources of
information regarding the quality and safety of products placed on the market.162
One such resource was Good Housekeeping magazine’s “Seal of Approval” for
products, inaugurated in the early 1900s.163 Shoppers also began to receive assistance
from new organizations founded with the mission of promoting consumer
awareness. The most important of these groups appeared after the 1927 publication
of the best-selling exposé Your Money’s Worth: A Study in the Waste of the Consumer’s
Dollar.164 The success of this book led to the formation of Consumers’ Research,
Incorporated, a consumer advocacy group.165 Beginning in 1931, this organization’s
biweekly bulletins detailed the hidden dangers of products such as toasters, vacuum
cleaners, automobiles, and cosmetics.166 Two Consumers’ Research employees soon
published another best-seller, 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs: Dangers in Food, Drugs, and
Cosmetics, which condemned the lack of safety testing before the titular products were
released onto the market.167 In 1936, disgruntled employees of Consumers’ Research
broke away and formed a rival organization, Consumers Union.168 This organization
launched its own magazine, Consumer Reports, which also sought to help consumers by
testing products for safety and utility, and offering recommendations as to their
acceptability.169 This publication expanded its circulation markedly in the years
immediately after World War II, and boasted several hundred thousand subscribers
by the early 1950s.170
In the post-World War II era, Consumer Reports and similarly minded
publications had plenty of products to criticize. Cigarettes and a variety of other
consumer products came under attack during this period as poorly designed or
otherwise unsafe. In 1952, Reader’s Digest—long “the only mainstream periodical of

Cf. Lynd, supra note 44, at 881 (observing that “The increase in new kinds of goods and services,
the decline in home handicraft knowledge, the increased complexity of mechanical devices and
fabricated commodities, new pressures on the consumer to buy, and new tensions within the
consumer, all make new demands for consumer literacy.”).
163 The Good Housekeeping Institute, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Dec. 1909, at 742.
164 See, e.g., MCGOVERN, supra note 44, at 170–83 (discussing this book and the response to it);
Norman D. Katz, Consumers Union: The Movement and the Magazine, 1936–1957 37 (Rutgers
University, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1977) (same).
165 NORMAN I. SILBER, TEST AND PROTEST: THE INFLUENCE OF CONSUMERS UNION 18 (1983).
166 MCGOVERN, supra note 44, at 191 and 426–27 (canvassing articles published by Consumers Research
on the safety of products such as toasters, vacuum cleaners, automobiles, hair removal products, and
cosmetics).
167 ARTHUR KALLET & FREDERICK J. SCHLINK, 100,000,000 GUINEA PIGS (1933). See also SILBER,
TEST AND PROTEST: THE INFLUENCE OF CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 165, at 18 (describing
100,000,000 Guinea Pigs as “one of the best-selling books of the decade”).
168 SILBER, TEST AND PROTEST: THE INFLUENCE OF CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 165, at 21–23.
169 Id.
170 See COHEN, supra note 161, at 131 (pegging Consumer Reports’ circulation at 700,000 as of 1954).
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the time to crusade against the alleged perils of tobacco”171—ran a short story titled
“Cancer by the Carton” that linked lung cancer to smoking.172 Several other
mainstream publications, including Time and Life, picked up the story.173 When
cigarette manufacturers unveiled “safer” filter-tip cigarettes in response to this
negative publicity, reports circulated that these cigarettes had tar and nicotine levels
similar to those found in “regular” cigarettes. Congress responded by investigating
whether cigarette companies engaged in false or misleading advertising in promoting
their new products.174
While this hearing failed to produce legislation, other unsafe products did
generate legislative responses. After flammable cowboy outfits killed or seriously
injured many children in the late 1940s and 1950s,175 leading to numerous lawsuits,176
Congress enacted the Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953.177 This law offered weak
protections, but it at least indicated a degree of interest in the subject of consumer
protection. Not long thereafter, the deaths of more than 75 children trapped in
refrigerators over a five-year span178 brought about the Refrigerator Safety Act of
1956.179

RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA’S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC
HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 112 (1997).
172 Roy Norr, Cancer by the Carton, READER’S DIGEST, Dec. 1952, at 738.
173 SILBER, TEST AND PROTEST: THE INFLUENCE OF CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 165, at 60.
174 False and Misleading Advertising (Filter-Tip Cigarettes): Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations, United States House of Representatives, 85th Cong. (1957). See also KLUGER, supra
note 171, at 188–89 (discussing these hearings); SILBER, supra note 165, at 63–68 (same).
175 At least one of the resulting lawsuits proceeded on a warranty theory (the statute of limitations
having expired for the plaintiff’s negligence claim), even though the fatally injured child was not the
purchaser of the cowboy suit. Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 111 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1953). See also
Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 177 N.Y.S.2d 7, 13 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1958) (discussing this
case).
176 See Barbara Young Welke, Owning Hazard, A Tragedy, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 693, 696 (2010)
(discussing lawsuits brought between 1945 and 1953 over flammable cowboy outfits).
177 Flammable Fabrics: Hearing Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate
82nd Cong. 8 (1952) (statement of Henry Miller, Assistant General Counsel in Charge of Industry
Cooperation, Federal Trade Commission) (“The great wave of burnings and even deaths which
children have suffered when wearing highly flammable cowboy playsuits is still within the memory of
many of us. Burning cases of most distressing character have also resulted from other fabrics and
garments.”). See also id. at 9–10 (listing examples of injuries caused by flammable fabrics and other
clothing items); Elliot P. Paley, Letter to the Editor, Inflammable Play Clothes: Testing of Cowboy Suits and
Stuffed Toys Suggested, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1948, at 24.
178 REQUIRING CERTAIN SAFETY DEVICES ON HOUSEHOLD REFRIGERATORS, SEN. REP. No. 2700, at
1 (1956). This report described the toll taken by these accidents:
From time to time the people of this Nation have been shocked to read in the
newspapers stories of children who were entrapped inside refrigerators and
iceboxes and were suffocated to death. In 1952, 14 such deaths were recorded, and
in 1953, 26 deaths were recorded. From January 1954 to June 1956, records show
that there were at least 33 incidents of suffocation in household refrigerators,
involving 54 children, of whom 39 died. With the number of such deaths increasing
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Automobile design choices also came under closer scrutiny during the
postwar period. Up until around 1950, people who decried the mounting number of
automobile-related deaths focused mostly upon unsafe driving, not defects in the
vehicles involved.180 Consumer magazines had printed stories during the 1930s about
how automobiles had been designed for “planned obsolescence,” but these articles
failed to spark broader interest in the subject.181 Around midcentury, Cornell
University’s Aeronautical Laboratory began to conduct safety tests on automobiles.182
These studies led to the formation of the Automotive Crash Injury Research Center
in 1952.183 The Center used the information it gathered from tests to develop specific
recommendations about how to improve the design of automobiles for enhanced
safety.184 One such recommendation involved the installation of seat belts, which
became an option available on Ford and Chrysler vehicles beginning with the 1956
model year.185 Though few other immediate safety improvements resulted, the
information produced by Cornell fed an emerging dialogue about automobile design
and safety in the halls of Congress186 and elsewhere187 that continued throughout the
each year, it is imperative that the Congress enact legislation to minimize these
deaths insofar as possible.
Id. See also Old Refrigerators Are Safety Hazard, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 16, 1955, at 38; A Drive on Menace of
Abandoned Iceboxes, LIFE, Dec. 15, 1953, at 57 (discussing child fatalities associated with iceboxes, and
reporting upon an exchange drive whereby 12-lb turkeys were traded for icebox doors). Cf. Child Safety
Measure Passed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1953, at 29 (describing an Oklahoma City ordinance that made it
illegal to leave a refrigerator outside without removing the door or providing a means of escape).
179 Refrigerator Safety Act, Pub. Law No. 84-930, 70 Stat. 953 (1956).
180 SILBER, supra note 165, at 80.
181 Id. at 83.
182 George H. Waltz, Jr., Making the Death Seat Safer, POPULAR SCI., Jul. 1950, at 82 (discussing research
at Cornell).
183 SILBER, supra note 165, at 87.
184 Id. See also SEYMOUR SCHWIMMER & ROBERT A. WOLF, LEADING CAUSES OF INJURY IN
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1962) (reporting the results of a study of crash-injury data).
185 SILBER, supra note 165, at 90.
186 In 1957, the House of Representatives held a hearing on safety belts in automobiles, in which
witnesses testified as to their benefits. Automobile Seat Belts: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives, 85th Cong. (1957). See also Paul N. Janes,
Seat Belts vs. Traffic Deaths, POPULAR MECHANICS, Mar. 1955, at 137; Paul W. Kearney, How Safe are the
1958 Cars?, POPULAR SCI., Jan. 1958, at 126 (“Despite some dragging of feet, it is evident from the
1958 models that safety is getting increasingly serious attention in Detroit.”).
187 E.g., Daniel P. Moynihan, Epidemic on the Highways, THE REPORTER, Apr. 30, 1959, at 16 (arguing
for the placement of greater pressure on automakers to enhance the safety of their vehicles); C.
Hunter Shelden, Prevention, the Only Cure for Head Injuries Resulting from Automobile Accidents, 159 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 981 (1955); Death on the Highways, 163 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 262 (1957). The Death on the
Highways article explained the value of the testing at Cornell:
Experimental tests at Cornell University and the careful investigation of recent
highway accidents have demonstrated the real values of such safety devices as seat
belts, crash padding, safety door locks, and collapsible steering wheels. It is to be
hoped that these safety features are only the beginning of a new era in basic
automobile design. Fundamental standard equipment should be designed in full
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1950s and would yield significant results in the 1960s.188
During this same postwar period, disturbing revelations emerged about drugs
and vaccines only recently hailed as panaceas. In the early 1950s the antibiotic
chloromycetin—praised as a new “wonder drug” on the front page of the New York
Times just a few years before189—was tied to a spate of serious, occasionally fatal
blood disorders.190 Meanwhile, a defective batch of polio vaccine manufactured by
Cutter Laboratories in 1955 infected many children with the disease the vaccine was
intended to prevent.191 This tragedy led to a civil action and a plaintiffs’ verdict on a
breach of warranty claim against Cutter (notwithstanding a lack of privity), which
was affirmed by a California Court of Appeal in 1960.192 And perhaps most
strikingly, in 1961 it became apparent that the anti-morning sickness drug
thalidomide had resulted in serious birth defects, such as deformed limbs, in some of
the children borne by women who used it.193 Thalidomide never had been licensed
for use in the United States, a close call that owed to the skepticism of a single Food
and Drug Administration reviewer.194 Nevertheless, some samples had been
distributed to doctors, leading to an unknown number of “thalidomide babies” being
born in this country.195
By the early 1960s, these seriatim revelations had started to instill in many
consumers a healthy skepticism regarding the safety of the products they used196 and
an enhanced appreciation of the available legal remedies when seemingly safe
products proved to be anything but. The existence of unsafe products was nothing
new; but expectations had changed. Earlier products cases such as Winterbottom and
MacPherson establish that at least some consumers had long appreciated a possible
recognition of the fact that every car may be involved, quite innocently, in a serious
crash or roll over.
Death on the Highways, 163 J. AM. MED. ASS’N at 262.
188 E.g., SILBER, supra note 165, at 93–99 (discussing automobile safety legislation of the 1960s).
189 William L. Laurence, “Wonder Drug,” Foe of Plagues, Is Made Artificially in Quantity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
27, 1949, at 1.
190 Continued Use of Chloromycetin Permitted, but Label Must Carry Warning to Physicians, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14, 1952, at 30; U.S. Warns Doctors on Chloromycetin, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 5, 1952, at 4. See also New Light on
the Wonder Drugs, CHANGING TIMES, Dec. 1953, at 35.
191 Note, The Cutter Polio Vaccine Incident: A Case Study of Manufacturers’ Liability Without Fault in Tort and
Warranty, 65 YALE L.J. 262, 262 (1955).
192 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 6 Cal.Rptr. 320 (Cal. App. 1960).
193 John Lear, The Unfinished Story of Thalidomide, SATURDAY REV., Sept. 1, 1962, at 35.
194ROBERT N. MAYER, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT: GUARDIANS OF THE MARKETPLACE 27 (1989).
195 Carl Zimmer, Answers Begin to Emerge on How Thalidomide Caused Defects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010,
at D3.
196 This skepticism was buoyed by Vance Packard’s The Hidden Persuaders, a 1957 bestseller on “[t]he
use of mass psychoanalysis to guide campaigns of persuasion.” VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN
PERSUADERS 3 (1957). The Hidden Persuaders spent almost a year on the New York Times best-seller list.
Richard Severo, Vance Packard, 82, Challenger of Consumerism, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1996, at B16.
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tort claim when a product unaccountably failed on them. The prevalence of cases
involving adulterated food products from the early 1900s onward signified the more
widespread recognition of a particularly pungent and obvious class of claims. As a
further step in this progression, during the 1950s and 1960s consumers gravitated
toward a view that manufacturers of a broad range of products owed them a
responsibility to make safer products, that many products could be made safer, and
that some unsafe products were—in the words of Consumer Reports’ test results—not
just to be avoided, but categorically “not acceptable.”197
This enhanced claim consciousness, and its connection to both the trends of
the time and the high-profile cases of the era, were captured by United States
Supreme Court Associate Justice Robert Jackson in his dissent in Dalehite v. United
States, a Federal Tort Claims Act case decided by the Court in 1953:
This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever-increasing extent
our population is dependent upon mass producers for its food and
drink, its cures and complexions, its apparel and gadgets. These no
longer are natural or simple products but complex ones whose
composition and qualities are often secret. Such a dependent society
must exact greater care than in more simple days and must require
from manufacturers or producers increased integrity and caution as
the only protection of its safety and well-being. Purchasers cannot try
out drugs to determine whether they kill or cure. Consumers cannot
test the youngster’s cowboy suit or the wife’s sweater to see if they
are apt to burst into fatal flames. Carriers, by land or by sea, cannot
experiment with the combustibility of goods in transit. Where
experiment or research is necessary to determine the presence or the
degree of danger, the product must not be tried out on the public,
nor must the public be expected to possess the facilities or the
See National Commission on Product Safety: Hearings Before the Consumer Subcommittee of the Committee on
Commerce United States Senate, 90th Cong. 9–11 (1967) (relating the types of products found “not
acceptable” by Consumers Union between 1956 and 1966, and the reasons for this rating). This
progression did not operate at an even pace across claims. Design defect claims tended to be more
difficult for juries to appreciate:
in the design cases, particularly those involving widely-used products made by
established manufacturers, judges and juries have been understandably hesitant to
impose liability. This hesitation results partly from a reluctance to let a jury pass on
a product prepared by experts in the field, and partly from a realization that a
judgment for a particular plaintiff may open the door to many additional claims and
suits. Occasionally there has been an apprehension that a judgment for the plaintiff
will necessitate extensive remodeling, or perhaps even removal from the market of
some much-used and widely-advertised product, with serious consequences to both
the manufacturer and his employees.
Dix W. Noel, Manufacturer’s Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 816
(1962).
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technical knowledge to learn for itself of inherent but latent dangers.
The claim that a hazard was not foreseen is not available to one who
did not use foresight appropriate to his enterprise.198
By the time President Kennedy proposed a bundle of modest consumerprotection measures to Congress in 1962,199 ushering in a decade of legislative
innovation in this sphere,200 American consumers already had learned to name their
products-related injuries, and were prepared to blame these injuries on
manufacturers and others within the supply chain.201 As these consumers came to
appreciate the possibility of legal redress for a growing array of products-related
injuries, they could consult an increasingly sophisticated and well-organized pool of
plaintiff’s attorneys, who had reasons of their own for pursuing products claims.
B. The Rise of Sophisticated Plaintiffs’ Counsel
Personal-injury lawyers, like attorneys generally, gravitated toward
professional associations in the post-World War II era.202 In 1946, 11 plaintiffs’
workers’ compensation attorneys formed the National Association of Claimants’
Compensation Attorneys, or NACCA.203 This organization soon expanded to serve
the entire plaintiffs’ personal-injury bar.204 By 1956 the NACCA claimed 8,300
members across 44 state branches and affiliates, and its flagship publication, the
NACCA Law Journal, had a circulation of around 10,000.205

Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 51–52 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
CONSUMERS’ PROTECTION AND INTEREST PROGRAM: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO CONSUMERS’ PROTECTION AND INTEREST PROGRAM, supra note 47.
200 See COHEN, supra note 161, at 345–63 (discussing the consumer movement of the 1960s and 1970s
and its origins).
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and early 1900s to greater claim awareness among plaintiffs).
202 Membership in the American Bar Association also swelled during this period. The ABA’s
membership rose from 34,134 as of July 1, 1945, Report of the Special Committee on Membership, in 71
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 246, 246 (1946) to more than 100,000 in 1961, Report of the Standing Committee on
Membership, in 71 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 533, 533 (1961).
203 RICHARD S. JACOBSON & JEFFREY R. WHITE, DAVID V. GOLIATH: ATLA AND THE FIGHT FOR
EVERYDAY JUSTICE 8–11 (2004); Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., NACCA-Rumor and Reflection, 18 NACCA
L.J. 25, 26–27 (1956). See also WITT, supra note 8, at 240–46 (summarizing the history of the NACCA).
In 1960, the NACCA changed its name to the National Association of Claimants’ Counsel of
America. In 1964, it changed its name again, this time to the American Trial Lawyers Association.
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204 Id. at 27–28.
205 JACOBSON & WHITE, supra note 203, at 23; Lambert, supra note 203, at 27–28.
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The law journal represented part of the NACCA’s larger educational mission.
It and another publication produced by the organization, the NACCA News Letter,
informed readers of recent appellate opinions and lucrative jury verdicts, and offered
tips on pleading, discovery, and trial techniques.206 To similar effect were educational
tours of the nation by some of the leaders of the organization, most notably Melvin
Belli.207 The San Francisco attorney and author of the multi-volume series Modern
Trials estimated in 1954 that over the preceding four years, he had addressed
audiences in all but three states.208 Also, each year the NACCA held an annual
convention and pre-convention that functioned as a networking session, teaching
seminar, and call to arms.209 Nearly verbatim transcripts of these proceedings were
stitched together into book form and made available for purchase.210
The NACCA connected its policy goals with its members’ cases and their
self-interest. One priority involved products-liability reform, and in particular,
elimination of the privity bar.211 The NACCA fostered in its members a sense that by
taking products-liability cases and arguing for doctrinal change, they could do good
while doing well. Arnold Elkind, a prominent NACCA member who would later
helm the National Commission on Product Safety,212 summarized both the altruistic
and the selfish reasons for bringing products cases in a speech to the American Bar
Association’s Section on Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law in 1957.213
Elkind told his audience that “there is a public service element involved. There is the
satisfaction that by your lawsuit you are protecting consumer [sic], and frequently
such a result obtains even though the lawsuit is unsuccessful.”214 Also, and probably
of at least equal significance:

Lambert, supra note 203, at 30.
WITT, supra note 203, at 241.
208 The King of Torts, LIFE, Oct. 18, 1954, at 71, 80.
209 See WITT, supra note 203, at 241–43 (describing these conventions).
210 E.g., TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS (Melvin M. Belli, ed. 1956).
211 See, e.g., Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Touchstones of Tort Liability, 24 NACCA L.J. 25, 25–26 (1959).
212 Eric Pace, A.B. Elkind, A Lawyer, Panel Chief and Writer, 80, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at B10.
213 Arnold B. Elkind, Reflections of a Plaintiff’s Lawyer on Manufacturers’ Liability Cases, 1957 A.B.A. SEC.
INS., NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. PROC. 50 (1957).
214 Id. at 53. In their attractiveness to plaintiffs’ lawyers, products-liability cases might be contrasted
with slip-and-falls—frequently identified as least-loved component of a lawyer’s caseload. E.g., Robert
G. Bagam, Slip and Fall, in AM. TRIAL LAWYERS ASS’N (FORMERLY NACCA) NINETEENTH ANN.
CONVENTION 1965 674, 674 (1966) (“The ‘slip and fall’ is the Cinderella of torts, and the stepchild of
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experienced trial lawyers can work them up by a kind of genetic awareness. But they remain important
not only because of their recurrence (they rank next to automobile accidents in incidence), but
because they can be singularly tough cases to win.”).
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On the practical side, we have found that the recoveries in such
lawsuits represent satisfactory compensation for damage sustained
more frequently than in the average case. We believe that this is so
because first there is usually absolutely no question of contributory
negligence; secondly, there is a dramatic contrast between the
innocent plaintiff and the “profit-hungry” manufacturer. If pressed, I
would have to admit that in the capably tried products liability case
there is probably an element of penal damages which enters into the
deliberations of the jury in fixing compensation.215
Other NACCA presentations also stressed the lucrative possibilities
presented by products cases. Attendees at the 1958 NACCA annual convention, for
example, were advised of a recent Missouri decision in a products-liability matter, “a
wonderful case” that, the speaker advised, was “interesting on the damages point,
too, because they gave an award of $85,000 to a woman claimant. And the court
entered a remittitur and sliced her down to $65,000. But we have been advised that,
even as reduced to $65,000, it is the largest award sustained for a woman claimant in
Missouri.”216 Three conventions later, a speaker reminded attendees that “products
liability cases today, properly prepared, are bringing among the highest of damage
awards.”217 Data bore out this assertion; just as the California Supreme Court was
handing down its Greenman decision, a report on jury verdicts calculated an average
verdict of $25,879 in products-liability cases in which the plaintiffs had prevailed, as
compared to an average plaintiff’s verdict of $11,473 in personal-injury cases
generally.218
The NACCA’s publications, training curriculum, networking opportunities,
and other offerings also helped its members overcome the practical issues associated
with recognizing and trying products cases. In the 1950s and early 1960s, appellate
decisions that chipped away at privity requirements in warranty cases received close
Elkind, supra note 213, at 53.
Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Torts, Prospects and Retrospects, in NACCA TWELFTH ANN. CONVENTION
1958 1, 9 (1958).
217 Louis R. Frumer, Recent Product Liability Highlights, in NACCA FIFTEENTH ANN. CONVENTION
1961 417, 417 (1962). These cases were not necessarily cheap to prosecute, however. One attorney
estimated in 1969 that the costs incurred by a plaintiff in a mine-run products case, independent of
legal fees, normally exceeded $5,000. NAT’L COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, HEARINGS LOS
ANGELES JUNE 1969 WASHINGTON JULY–AUG. 1969 448 (1970) (statement of James J. Reidy).
218 Wallace E. Sedgwick, Products Liability: Trial Problems in Warranty Cases, 30 INS. COUNS. J. 616, 616
(1963). A study of Chicago jury verdicts in tort cases tried during this time frame also revealed higher
average verdicts in products-liability lawsuits than in any other class of tort suits. MARK A. PETERSON
& GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS AND VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY,
ILLINOIS, 1960–1979 24–26 (1982). But see MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON,
COMPARATIVE JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES, 1959–1980
18 (1983) (describing products-liability lawsuits as “modest-payoff” cases for plaintiffs in San
Francisco courts, based on a study of jury verdicts rendered in that city between 1959 and 1980).
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attention in the NACCA Law Journal.219 Annual meetings commonly featured
sessions in which attorneys shared tips on handling products-liability matters.220
Leading cases were promoted at these meetings as “wedges” for further doctrinal
change in the products field.221 Other speakers encouraged attorneys to pursue novel
products-liability claims.222 One speech given at the NACCA’s annual convention in
1954, “The Liability in Tort or Warranty of Automobile Manufacturers for the
Inherently Dangerous Design of Passenger Automobiles,” urged attendees to
incorporate design-defect allegations into their automobile-accident cases. “As
lawyers, our inquiry in automobile accident cases has been directed toward
determining the cause of the accident,” the speaker advised, “to the exclusion of the
equally pertinent question as to whether the injuries may have resulted from the
design of the vehicle in which our client was riding in addition to the fact of the
collision.”223 A few years later, the organization initiated a products-liability
“exchange” whereby members could share pleadings, briefs, and information
regarding experts and individual products.224 In launching the exchange, the
NACCA’s president advised the organization’s members that “no one need ever
again feel alone in his professional tasks in the tort field.”225
This increasingly well-organized plaintiff’s bar helped catalyze and capitalize
upon the caselaw breakthroughs of the early 1960s. Attorneys increasingly framed
their products cases with an eye toward prompting doctrinal change. Bernard
Chazen, an NACCA member who argued the Henningsen appeal for the plaintiffs,
incorporated within the plaintiffs’ opening appellate brief excerpts from both the
Prosser and the Harper and James treatises in which the authors criticized a rigid
E.g., Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Comments on Recent Important Personal Injury (Tort) Cases, 25 NACCA
L.J. 47, 84–91 (1960) (discussing B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959)); id.
at 94–95 (discussing Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 343 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1960)).
220 E.g., Products Liability, in NACCA TWELFTH ANN. CONVENTION 1958 290, 305 (1958) (comments
of Melvin Belli) (encouraging plaintiffs’ attorneys to plead several causes of action in products-liability
cases, as they were “on the frontier of something new”). See also TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS: 1957
BELLI SEMINAR 86–89 (Melvin M. Belli, ed., 1958) (relating a free-ranging discussion about products
liability among several NACCA attorneys); TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS: 1958 BELLI SEMINAR 50–55
(Melvin M. Belli, ed., 1959) (discussing warranty cases).
221 Products Liability, supra note 220, at 308 (comments of Melvin Belli).
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represent injured consumers in actions against manufacturers of defective products.”).
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Design of Passenger Automobiles, in TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS 903, 903 (Melvin M. Belli, ed., 1956).
224 Paul D. Rheingold, NACCA Products Liability Exchange, in NACCA SIXTEENTH ANN.
CONVENTION 1962 359, 359–64 (1963). Alfred S. Julien, President’s Column, NACCA NEWS LETTER,
Sept. 1958, at 1, 2 (discussing the creation of the products-liability exchange).
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privity requirement in warranty cases.226 When the New Jersey Supreme Court sided
with the Henningsen plaintiffs, the NACCA’s publications arm immediately broadcast
the decision to its members. The July 1960 NACCA News Letter announced that,
“The New Jersey Supreme Court, on May 9, 1960, in a masterly opinion by Justice
Francis, handed down a decision which is not only a milestone, landmark and
turning point in the history of products liability but also one of the finest
accomplishments of the judicial process in our generation.”227 The NACCA Law
Journal similarly described Henningsen as “a milestone, turning point and breakthrough
in the law of products liability.”228 Later that year, Chazen and another attorney who
also worked on the Henningsen appeal told attendees at the NACCA’s annual
convention that the opinion was “[l]ike a new star in the skies.”229
Armed with Henningsen, plaintiffs’ attorneys filed an unprecedented number
of products-liability actions across the nation.230 As early as 1961, a former NACCA
president said that the field was “widening so rapidly that it is difficult to keep up
with the march of citations.”231 By 1963, a defense attorney would describe products
liability as “the fastest growing, the most controversial and probably the most
important field in tort law and casualty insurance today.”232 On this point, the
attorney related the findings of a recent study that had detected an uptick in
products-liability lawsuits.233 The authors of the report attributed this spike to “(1)
relaxation of the privity requirement in many jurisdictions, and (2) increased
awareness and use of the breach of warranty cause of action.”234
Plaintiffs’ lawyers redoubled their efforts after the Greenman decision and the
promulgation of Section 402A, as the products-liability terrain shifted away from
warranty and toward tort law.235 The overlapping nature of warranty and tort in the
products-liability context encouraged these attorneys to dangle Section 402A bait in
front of courts that already had bit on warranty. After all, it cost very little to allege
Brief for Plaintiffs as Cross-Appellants, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., Superior Court of
New Jersey Appellate Division, Docket No. A-185-58, at 18–21.
227 From the Editor’s Scratch Pad, NACCA NEWS LETTER, July 1960, at 3, 3.
228 Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Comments on Recent Important Personal Injury (Tort) Cases, 25 NACCA L.J. 47,
96 (1960).
229 Nathan Baker & Bernard Chazen, The Henningsen Case: A Landmark in Products Liability, in NACCA
FOURTEENTH ANN. CONVENTION 1960 588 (1961).
230 Jack L. Kroner, et al., Torts, in 1966 ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 209, 224 (1967) (“in the mere six years
following Henningsen, over 200 decisions in more than thirty states have adopted strict liability.”).
231 Alfred S. Julien, Trial Techniques, in NACCA FIFTEENTH ANN. CONVENTION 1961 403, 403 (1962).
232 Sedgwick, supra note 218, at 616.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 JACOBSON & WHITE, supra note 203, at 98–99 (discussing the ubiquity of NACCA members in
lobbying courts to adopt strict products liability).
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an additional theory of recovery in these cases. As early as 1958, Melvin Belli had
advised his colleagues at the NACCA annual convention to allege as many as six or
seven causes of action in a products case: a specific act of negligence; res ipsa loquitur,
express and implied warranty, “absolute liability,” a violation of a statute, and a
failure to warn claim.236 The availability of multiple possible defendants in many
products cases also encouraged innovation. Even where courts had not adopted
broadened warranty protections, if the plaintiff had purchased the offending item,
the retailer at a minimum represented a viable defendant under existing law. With at
least some recovery likely, it cost the plaintiff relatively little to add the manufacturer
or wholesaler as a defendant, and to tack on a strict-liability claim as to all of the
allegedly responsible parties.
The discussion above provides a different way of understanding the switch to
strict products liability. Academics conceived of products liability and defined its
contours; judges adopted it. The existing narrative ends there. But the contributions
of plaintiffs and their attorneys also must be acknowledged, since they provided the
lifeblood for this transformation in the law. Without their cases, academics and
judges would have little motivation to innovate, and no material with which to work.
And while it is easy to assume that plaintiffs and their attorneys will rally around
every liability-enhancing reform—an “if you build it, they will come” approach to
doctrinal change—this is not in fact the case. Plaintiffs do not appreciate each and
every cause of action that may arise,237 and may abandon even well-recognized
torts.238 Likewise, attorneys may turn their backs or decline to cultivate causes of
action that do not appear to be especially lucrative.239 In this respect, the proliferation

Products Liability, supra note 220, at 305 (comments of Melvin Belli). See also TRIAL AND TORT
TRENDS: 1958 BELLI SEMINAR, supra note 220, at 50–51 (also relating this presentation). Tellingly,
Belli did not include a design-defect claim within this mix, underscoring its marginal status as of that
time. Cf. Kenneth Parker, et al., Torts, in 1967 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. at 191, 217 (1968) (observing
that design-defect cases are “still predicated upon the theory of negligence” and that there was a “low
rate of recovery in this area of products liability law.”); Kroner, et al., supra note 230, at 210 (“As a
practical matter, it is probably a good deal more difficult to convince a judge to decide a design issue,
as distinguished from a construction issue, and to get a jury to decide a design issue against a
defendant, because of the relatively esoteric nature of the question.”).
237 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER, ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 122–23 (1991) (finding a marked difference in claiming tendencies between persons injured in
automobile accidents on the one hand, and persons injured in different circumstances on the other);
Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1099–1103 (1996);
Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System – And Why
Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1183–86 (1992) (reviewing several studies regarding injury awareness
and claiming patterns among prospective and actual plaintiffs).
238 See generally Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 359 (2008) (discussing the
disappearance of various tort theories due to abolition, abandonment, or other reasons).
239 See BRICKMAN, supra note 155; Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical
Liability System, 67 VAND. L. REV. 151, 154 (2014) (discussing the damages threshold under which
plaintiffs’ attorneys, per their survey responses, will not accept a medical-malpractice case).
236
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of strict products liability may owe as much to its literal value, from the perspective
of attorneys, as to its expressive value, in the minds of judges.
At the same time, not all mid-century products lawsuits placed equal pressure
on existing doctrine. Some types of cases made the argument for a strict-liability
approach better than others did. The next section of this article discusses another
way to view the products-liability revolution, as a practical response to the challenges
presented by particular case tropes that appeared often at midcentury, if not today.
IV. THE PRACTICAL NARRATIVE: “BOTTLE CASES” AND THEIR DISCONTENTS
In hindsight, it seems odd that courts adopted strict products liability as
quickly as they did, given the relative rarity of these cases at the time of this
transition. According to one study, between 1950 and 1970, products liability and
malpractice cases, combined, amounted to only 1.6 percent of all cases heard by a
surveyed subset of the nation’s state supreme courts.240 Products cases were not
especially common at the trial-court level, either; one study of case outcomes in Los
Angeles Superior Court in 1961 and 1962 identified only fifteen warranty cases
among the 945 jury verdicts rendered in tort matters during that span.241
That courts nevertheless rushed en masse toward strict liability to the
consumer suggests that either they perceived products cases as more common than
they actually were, or that they regarded the issues presented by these cases as
particularly troubling or significant. On the latter point, prevailing explanations of
strict products liability’s rise attribute judicial enthusiasm for this reform to a sense
that it perfectly captured the intellectual and social zeitgeist. Judges had to sign on,
lest they were to appear behind the times.242
Such sentiments probably did influence many judges. Yet there existed
another, more practical reason for courts to adopt an unvarnished exception to the
prevailing negligence rule. While strict products liability, whether framed in tort or in
warranty, had much to commend it from a broad policy perspective, it also had
certain practical (if less revolutionary) advantages over a negligence regime, especially
as applied to certain case types that appeared quite often before midcentury judges.
Robert A. Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870–1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 145
(1977).
241 Los Angeles Jury Verdicts for 1961–1962 Summarized, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 28, 1963, at 1. Per this
tabulation, automobile cases dominated the Superior Court’s docket. Warranty cases also were
outnumbered by slip-and-falls, malpractice cases, and construction accidents. Id. See also Jury Verdict
Chart for 1954-57 Shows L.A. County Recoveries, METROPOLITAN NEWS (L.A.), April 22, 1958, at 1
(showing only a handful of warranty cases among Los Angeles Superior Court cases with reported
jury verdicts during the 1954–1957 time frame).
242 Priest, supra note 6, at 519.
240
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Most notably, strict products liability averted the thorny problems that could arise
with proving a particular defendant’s fault when there existed multiple parties in the
supply chain, and a product that could have been compromised anywhere between
the points of manufacture and sale. This advantage represented an essential
component of the reformist pitch for strict liability. Here, consider once again
Prosser’s description of the specific problems with negligence in his Assault on the
Cathedral article.243 In relating his concerns, Prosser’s usual talent for drumming up
string citations to hammer home a point momentarily deserted him. Prosser cited
only one case for the proposition that the product’s manufacturer may be outside the
jurisdiction, and just one other for the principle that the manufacturer may be
unknown.244 But when it came to the problem of proving negligence on the part of a
particular defendant in the supply channel, Prosser had no trouble producing a
hypothetical with a lengthy list of citations. These cases all involved a single product:
glass beverage bottles that had exploded, shattered, or chipped.245
Prosser chose this example wisely, as had Traynor sixteen years earlier in his
Escola concurrence.246 Bottle lawsuits neatly captured the intractable problems with
negligence doctrine as applied to certain products cases, and were common (and
factually similar) enough to make these shortcomings apparent to a broad audience.
Though this fact may be difficult to appreciate today, as late as 1969 the humble
glass beverage bottle was described by a National Commission on Product Safety
official as being among the most dangerous of all household products.247 And
Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 60, at 1116.
Id.
245 Id.
246 Likewise, Harper and James would hone in on exploding bottles as a paradigm example of the
problems that could be associated with proving a particular defendant’s negligence in a products case.
2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 100, at § 28.14. Other commentators made similar observations. One
noted:
A classic example of the difficulties involved in actions based on negligence is
pointed up in the exploding bottle claims. It is quite generally accepted that the
almost complete impossibility of proving negligence in such suits together with the
lack of privity of contract upon which to base a breach of warranty action, is
responsible for the trend towards adoption of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in
many states.
Gleason, supra note 60, at 117. See also James, Products Liability, supra note 100, at 74 (using explodingbottle cases as an example of the difficulties associated with connecting a product defect to a
particular defendant in the supply chain); Robert W. Miller, Manufacturers’ Product Liability Re-Visited, 23
INS. COUNSEL J. 175 (1956) (discussing numerous bottle cases in connection with a more general
examination of products liability).
247 NAT’L COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 217, at 441–42 (testimony of Larry A.
Schott) (describing the results of a survey of insurance claims involving household products, which
revealed that glass bottles gave rise to the most claims, by far). According to this official, glass bottles
were associated with 150,000 injuries a year, 90,000 of which involved children ages 14 or younger. Id.
at 441. See also Paul S. Bergeson, et al., Pop Bottle Explosions, 238 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1048, 1048 (1977)
(“The problem of explosions of carbonated soft drink bottles is an environmental hazard that has not
243
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although Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Fresno248 is the only widely remembered
bottle case, these matters once provided courts with a great deal of business. 249
Stacks of reported cases dealt with the aftermath of a bottle that had fractured or
exploded.250 In the fifteen years prior to 1963, the supreme courts of more than half
of the states took up at least one of these matters.251 Indeed, bottle cases may have
been the most common of all products-liability lawsuits.252 These cases were wellreceived adequate attention in the medical literature but appears to be of substantial magnitude.”).
248 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
249 See Julien, Trial Techniques, supra note 231, at 404 (describing bottle cases as “a real staple in
products liability”).
250 In 1960, Roscoe Pound identified 133 published decisions involving exploding bottles, coming
from 31 different jurisdictions. Roscoe Pound, The Problem of the Exploding Bottle, 40 B.U. L. REV. 167,
169 (1960). See also Paul D. Kaufman, Torts, in 1944 ANN. SURV. OF AM. LAW, 938, 954 (1945) (“The
bottle cases continue without abatement. Standardization of judicial treatment would seem to be
indicated.”) (footnote omitted); Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Comments on Recent Important Personal Injury
(Tort) Cases, 25 NACCA L.J. 47, 99 (1960) (referencing a “floodtide” of bursting-bottle cases); Walter
M. Clark, Note, The Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Cases Involving Bursting Bottles, 1951
WASH U. L.Q. 216, 216 (1951) (“The past few decades have seen the rise of considerable litigation
concerning injuries to persons resulting from bursting or exploding bottles.”); C.S. Patrinelis,
Annotation, Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied to Bursting of Bottled Beverages, Food Containers, Etc., 4 A.L.R. 2d
466 (1949) (listing bottle cases).
251 At least 28 state supreme courts decided at least one injury-by-bottle case during this span (with
only the last decision listed in jurisdictions entertaining more than one of these cases): Alabama
(Florence Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Sullivan, 65 So.2d 169 (Ala. 1953)), Arkansas (Coca-Cola Bottling
Co of Fort Smith, Ark. v. Hicks, 223 S.W.2d 762 (Ark. 1949)); California (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co. of Fresno, 247 P.2d 344 (Cal. 1952)), Colorado (Chapman v. Redwine, 370 P.2d 147 (Colo.
1962)), Connecticut (Crisanti v. Cremo Brewing Co., 72 A.2d 655 (Conn. 1950)), Delaware (Ciociola
v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 A.2d 252 (Del. 1961)); Florida (Burkett v. Panama City
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 93 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1957)), Kansas (Morrison v. Kansas City Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 263 P.2d 217 (Kan. 1953)), Kentucky (Bogie v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Danville,
Inc. (Ky. 1961)); Maryland (Joffre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 158 A.2d 631 (Md. 1960)),
Massachusetts (Selissen v. Empire Bottling Co., 180 N.E.2d 324 (Mass. 1962)), Michigan (Pattinson v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Port Huron, 52 N.W.2d 699 (Mich. 1952)), Minnesota (Johnson v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co. of Willmar, 51 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1952)), Mississippi (Johnson v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 125 So.2d 537 (Miss. 1960)), Missouri (Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 222 S.W.2d
87 (Mo. 1949)), New Hampshire (Smith v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 92 A.2d 58 (N.H. 1952)), New
Jersey (Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 139 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1958)), New York (Day v. Grand
Union Co., 109 N.E.2d 609 (N.Y. 1952)) North Carolina (Graham v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 125 S.E.2d 429 (N.C. 1962)), North Dakota (Kuntz v. McQuade, 95 N.W.2d 430 (N.D. 1959)),
Oklahoma (Michel v. Branham, 327 P.2d 440 (Okla. 1958)), Oregon (Robertson v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co. of Walla Walla, 247 P.2d 217 (Or. 1952)), Pennsylvania (Braccia v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Philadelphia, 157 A.2d 747 (Pa. 1960)), South Carolina (Boyd v. Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 126
S.E.2d 178 (S.C. 1962)), Tennessee (Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Crow, 291 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn.
1956)), Texas (Hankins v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 249 S.W.2d 1008 (Tex. 1952)), West Virginia
(Ferrell v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Charleston, W. Va., 109 S.E.2d 489 (W.Va. 1959)); and
Wisconsin (Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 93 N.W.2d 467 (Wis. 1958)).
252 To probe this point, a search was conducted of all state supreme court decisions issued between
January 1, 1955 and December 31, 1959, that have been tagged with West Reporter Service Key 313A
(Products Liability). This query returned 85 decisions. Notwithstanding the key, some of these
decisions were not “true” products-liability cases, in that the gravamen of the plaintiff’s claim or
claims concerned negligence on the part of a product user, rather than a defect in the product itself.
Nevertheless, the products involved in these cases provide some indication of the sorts of products-
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known among academics and practitioners, as well. Numerous law-review articles
addressed exploding-bottle lawsuits and the problems they presented,253 and NACCA
seminars often included presentations on how to try these matters.254
Bottle cases were common throughout the early-to-mid 1900s because of a
robust claim consciousness of the sort discussed in the prior narrative. Glass
beverage bottles were ubiquitous from the early 1900s, when new technologies
appeared that allowed for their mass manufacture,255 through the 1970s, when they
were overtaken first by aluminum cans equipped with the novel “pop-top”
mechanism,256 and later by plastic containers.257 Throughout this span, when one of
liability claims being pressed at that time. In declining order of frequency with which they appeared,
the products associated with these cases were: beverage bottles (fifteen cases); automobiles (eight
cases); tractors and tractor accessories (four cases each); mink feed, rifles (three cases each); firearms
cartridges, liniments (two cases each); antiseptic, a baler, a building truss, carbon tetrachloride, cattle
feed, a cautery instrument, cement, cement base paint, a chair, cinder blocks, a concrete mixer,
concrete, concrete slabs, an escalator, feed barrels, fish food, flea repellant, floor finish, a furnace, a
gas meter, a gas ranger, gasoline, a glass door, a glass jar, hair dye, a harvester, a house trailer, an ice
crushing machine, insecticide, a kerosene wallpaper steaming machine, liquefied natural gas, lockers, a
mixer machine, a perfume bottle, a portable grain elevator, a power mower, a refrigerator, sausage, a
scaffold, shampoo, a steam pipe, a stepladder, steel, suntan lotion, turkey feed, a valve, wood
preservative, and an X-ray cable (one case each).
In an identical search performed on caselaw issued one decade earlier (i.e., state supreme court cases
decided between 1945 to 1949), the proportion of bottle cases among the 48 cases marked with a
Products Liability key was even more pronounced. Beverage bottles were involved in fifteen of these
cases, as compared with automobiles (three cases); pesticide, a water heater (two cases each); an
abrasive cutting-off wheel, antifreeze, a baler, a beer barrel, carbon tetrachloride, a cosmetic box,
fungicide, a fur collar, a furnace, a gas heater, glass, hair lacquer, hay, hydrofluoric acid, an ice-scoring
machine, liquid heat quench, milling machinery, perfume, a portable grain elevator, a rail-support
hanger, seed corn drier, shampoo, a stove, stove polish, sulphuric acid, and a vulcanizing machine
(one case each).
253 E.g., Will D. Davis, Liability of Manufacturers of Bottled Beverages, 5 BAYLOR L. REV. 258 (1953);
William E. Knight, Let the Bottler Beware!, 21 INS. COUNS. J. 72 (1954); Pound, supra note 250; Craig
Spangenberg, Exploding Bottles, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 516 (1963); Alfred L. Steff, Jr., The Exploding Bottle:
Why Not Absolute Liability?, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 115 (1964); Leon Whitehurst, Jr., Torts: Res Ipsa
Loquitur in Exploding Bottle Cases, 1 U. FLA. L. REV. 470, 472 (“with each new application of res ipsa
loquitur the growing majority of American courts move nearer to the imposition of absolute liability
upon the bottler.”); Res Ipsa Loquitur – Explosion of Bottle, CENTRAL L.J., Apr. 22, 1921, at 290; Clark,
supra note 250.
254 E.g., Products Liability, supra note 220, at 297 (comments of Alfred S. Julien). See also J. Campbell
Palmer III, Advances in Exploding Bottle Cases, NACCA THIRTEENTH ANN. CONVENTION 1959 191
(1960).
255 Machinery that could mass-produce glass bottles was invented in 1907. U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT
SAFETY COMMISSION, HAZARD ANALYSIS: BOTTLES FOR CARBONATED SOFT DRINKS 1 (1975). Some
of these bottles were “returnable.” The cleaning and reuse of these bottles subjected them to
significant wear-and-tear, making them more prone to breakage. In 1948, there appeared
“nonreturnable” bottles, which avoided the problems of reuse, but at a price. Nonreturnable bottles
were made of thinner glass, and may have been more likely to explode upon initial use. Id.
256 E.C. Fraze invented a practical pull-top for beverage canisters in 1962, MASS PRODUCTION:
PRODUCTS FROM PHAIDON DESIGN CLASSICS, VOLUME TWO 592 (2009); E.C. Fraze, 76; Designed Pull
Tab, N.Y. TIMES, October 28, 1989, at 11. This invention (and its successor, the ring top) solved a
problem that, up to that point, had prevented the widespread use of metal cans as beverage
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these bottles suddenly ruptured, it was easy for would-be plaintiffs to appreciate that
they had suffered an injury attributable to an outside force rather than their own
fault.258 Enough bottles exploded, shattered, or chipped to inflict a substantial
number of cut fingers and gouged eyes,259 but not so many that people appreciated
these harms as the price paid for a “pause that refreshes.”260 Quite the contrary; these
injuries seemed completely at odds with the pleasant messages conveyed by beverage
companies’ omnipresent advertising.261 Finally, the popularity and notoriety of a
related variety of lawsuit, the “mouse in a bottle” adulterated-beverage claim, may
have conditioned prospective plaintiffs and their lawyers to regard bottlers as entities
susceptible to suit in tort.262
Given these circumstances, people seriously injured by glass bottles readily
appreciated that they might have a claim, and found lawyers to take their cases.263 But
containers.
257 Glenn Fowler, N.C. Wyeth, Inventor, Dies at 78; Developed the Plastic Soda Bottle, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
1990, at 12. Today, soda sold in glass bottles accounts for only two percent of all soda sales. Paul
Ziobro, Glass Bottles Lend Pop to Soda Makers, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2013, 9:06 P.M.),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324577904578557683250090950.
258 Once these cases started to appear, there may have been a “snowball effect,” with other would-be
plaintiffs and their attorneys becoming conditioned to regard bottlers and bottle manufacturers as
entities amenable to suit. Cf. TRISTAN DONOVAN, FIZZ: HOW SODA SHOOK UP THE WORLD 77–78
(2014) (discussing various types of claims brought against soda bottlers, and the bottlers’ response).
One datapoint that suggests that people injured by bursting bottles were especially cognizant of the
possibility of recovery involves the frequency with which these individuals filed insurance claims. At
least in the 1960s, people injured by bottles appear to have filed more insurance claims, on a perinjury basis, than people injured by other products. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT
SAFETY, supra note 217, at 447 (statement of Larry A. Schott) (discussing how far more insurance
claims were filed for injuries associated with glass bottles than were filed for injuries associated with
power lawn mowers, even though the two types of products produced roughly equal injury tolls.).
259 E.g., Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 93 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Wis. 1958) (referencing a damages
demand of $31,537 in an exploding-bottle case where the glass had put out a child’s eye); Ray R.
Christensen, Exploding Bottles, 10 AM. JUR. TRIALS 381, 388 (1965) (discussing the types of injuries that
appeared in exploding bottle cases); Morton Mintz, Insurers Report High Claims of Injury by Exploding
Bottles, WASH. POST, July 30, 1969, at A2 (discussing the injuries that children had suffered due to
exploding or broken bottles).
260 Andrew Dingwall, Exploding Bottles, 11 NACCA L.J. 158, 170 (1953) (“the public knows nothing of
the ‘idiosyncracies of glass’ especially with regard to internal damage and does not expect to handle
beverage bottles with all the tenderness of a new father for his new born child.”). See also NAT’L
COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 217, at 567–68 (statement of Owens-Illinois, Inc.)
(observing that Owens-Illinois manufactured approximately 12 billion soft drink and beer bottles
annually between 1965 and 1968, but encountered fewer than 90 bottle claims and lawsuits each year).
261 For an example of judicial notice being taken of soda companies’ prolific advertising campaigns,
see Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 So.2d 873, 874–75 (La. 1952).
262 See DONOVAN, supra note 258, at 77–78 (discussing the various types of lawsuits alleged against
soda bottlers, and the bottlers’ response).
263 More speculatively, the abundance of published appellate decisions that involved bottle cases also
may have owed to particularly aggressive defenses put on in these matters. A plaintiff’s attorney
testified before the National Commission on Product Safety in 1969 that the defendants in bottle
cases “generally don’t settle them,” partially because “it was very difficult to prove” these cases—at
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regardless of whether a plaintiff sued the bottle’s manufacturer, the bottler who filled
it with a drink, the retailer who sold the product,264 or some combination of these
defendants, she usually had a tough row to hoe in proving negligence.265 Even
assuming a jurisdiction had adopted the MacPherson doctrine, removing privity as an
issue in most negligence cases,266 the mere fact of a broken or exploding bottle did
not necessarily spell negligence on the part of the manufacturer, bottler, or retailer,
either individually or collectively. Each of these defendants could point a finger at
the others as the culpable parties, and even a bottle that had been created, cleaned,
filled, and inspected with reasonable care could break or explode for unknown
reasons.267
When a plaintiff could not point to any specific act of negligence and sought
to rely on res ipsa loquitur as a path toward recovery, she encountered several
obstacles. The offending bottle typically had been placed into several parties’ hands
as part of the supply chain, and the plaintiff herself often had custody of the bottle
for some time prior to its rupture. These facts meant a given defendant lacked the
“exclusive control” of the harm-causing instrumentality that courts traditionally
demanded as a prerequisite for application of res ipsa loquitur.268
Unsurprisingly, some judges tinkered with existing doctrine to provide a
remedy, or at least a jury, to sympathetic plaintiffs.269 Writing in 1960, Roscoe Pound
least, prior to the adoption of strict liability in tort. NAT’L COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, supra
note 217, at 484–85 (testimony of James J. Reidy).
264 Of these possible defendants, bottlers were identified as plaintiffs’ “prime target” in bottle cases.
Christensen, supra note 259, at 425. This same resource described suits against bottle manufacturers as
rare, due to jurisdictional issues that sometimes appeared, and difficulties associated with proving the
manufacturer’s fault. Id. at 402. As for retailers, “[a]s a tactical matter a plaintiff suing the bottler on a
negligence theory will often join the retailer as a defendant on a warranty theory,” for reasons
including the fact that “[t]he memory of the retailer’s clerks is often greatly improved under these
circumstances.” Id. at 401.
265 Gleason, supra note 60, at 117; Clark, supra note 250, at 216 (“In order to recover from the
manufacturer, a person so injured is confronted with a serious proof problem.”).
266 For a sample of the many cases that expressly rejected a privity requirement in bottle cases
sounding in negligence, as opposed to warranty, see Macres v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 287 N.W.2d
922, 925–26 (Mich. 1939); Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 271 S.W. 497, 499 (Mo. 1925); Smith v. Peerless
Glass Co., 181 N.E. 576, 577 (N.Y. 1932); Grant v. Graham Chero-Cola Bottling Co., 97 S.E. 27, 28–
29 (N.C. 1918).
267 See Dingwall, supra note 260, at 167–70 (discussing the difficulties associated with detecting a
defective bottle). Most plaintiffs’ attorneys focused blame on the soda bottler, rather than the
manufacturer of the bottle or the retailer. Among the errors attributed to the bottler, it was believed
that methods used to clean bottles introduced “chattersleek,” a scoring of their interiors that might
make them prone to explode. Products Liability, supra note 220, at 291 (comments of Alfred S. Julien).
See also Russell L. Wald, Due Care in Handling Bottle Containing Carbonated Beverage, 33 AM. JUR. PROOF
OF FACTS 2d 1, 9 (1983) (discussing the various ways in which the integrity of a glass bottle can
become compromised); Dingwall, supra note 260, at 167–69 (same).
268 Mark Shain, Res Ipsa Loquitur, 17 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 192 (1944).
269 See Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 158 N.E.2d 342, 346 n.3 (Mass. 1959) (relating a
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identified seven different approaches courts had taken to the negligence issue in
exploding-bottle cases.270 Several of these approaches liberalized res ipsa loquitur
doctrine to allow plaintiffs an inference of negligence, at least against the bottler,
notwithstanding the lack of exclusive control.271 One case cluster allowed the
plaintiff a res ipsa loquitur inference provided that she introduced some evidence that
indicated the bottle had not been abused or mishandled after it left the defendant’s
hands.272 Other courts allowed the plaintiff to invoke res ipsa loquitur if she showed
that other bottles filled by the bottler had exploded around the time of the accident
in question.273 And still another approach allowed a plaintiff to rely upon res ipsa
loquitur merely upon establishing that her bottle had exploded, “since reasonable men
know that when bottles are properly manufactured and filled, they do not blow
up.”274
The increasingly aggressive application of res ipsa loquitur in bottle cases275
meant that by midcentury, many observers understood that some courts were
applying negligence in name only in these matters, and justifying this sleight-of-hand
on public-policy grounds.276 One such commentator, summing up the state of the
law in 1960, wrote that “it seems obvious from the talk of public policy which

perceived transition toward liberalized application of res ipsa loquitur in bottle cases); Johnson v. CocaCola Bottling Co., 125 So.2d 537, 541–42 (Miss. 1960) (same); James, Products Liability, supra note 100,
at 76–77 (same); Patrinelis, supra note 250, at 467–68 (same).
270 Pound, supra note 250, at 169–170.
271 Id. See also Dix W. Noel, Manufacturers of Products—The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV.
963, 978 (1957) (discussing the trend toward application of liberalized versions of res ipsa loquitur in
exploding-bottle cases).
272 E.g., Florence Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Sullivan, 65 So.2d 169, 175 (Ala. 1953) (stating that the
“general trend” in exploding-bottle cases was to adopt this approach); Thompson v. Burke
Engineering Sales Co., 106 N.W.2d 351, 353–54 (Iowa 1960) (discussing this line of precedent). See
also James, Products Liability, supra note 100, at 76 (“Today . . . a majority of courts seem willing to
invoke res ipsa loquitur in bursting bottle cases, where a proper foundation is laid.”).
273 E.g., Merchant v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 51 S.E.2d 749, 751 (S.C. 1949). See also
Patrinelis, supra note 250, at 479 (discussing this approach).
274 Ford Motor Co. v. Fish, 335 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ark. 1960). A few courts, but only a few, also
authorized the use of res ipsa loquitur to generate an inference of negligence against multiple defendants
in the supply chain. E.g., Nichols v. Nold, 268 P.2d 317, 323 (Kan. 1953); Loch v. Confair, 93 A.2d
451, 454 (Pa. 1953).
275 See, e.g., Riecke v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass’n, 227 S.W. 631 (Mo. App. 1921) (affirming the
use of res ipsa loquitur in an exploding-bottle case where the defendant bought “only the highest grade
bottles,” part of each order was tested before purchase, the bottles’ mold also was tested prior to its
use in the manufacture of bottles, the substance (Bevo) poured into the bottles was “not naturally an
explosive substance,” and the case before the court “was the first time that a bottle had ever
exploded.”).
276 See Knight, supra note 253, at 7 (“it is apparent that the present trend is toward absolute liability in
bottle cases.”); Whitehurst, supra note 253, at 472 (“with each new application of res ipsa loquitur the
growing majority of American courts move nearer to the imposition of absolute liability upon the
bottler.”).
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constantly recurs in opinions, that courts are designedly imposing strict liability as a
means of ensuring that soft drink manufacturers take consummate protections.”277
But these reforms did not assist every plaintiff in a bottle case. Even under
liberalized regimes, many plaintiffs could not show that the bottle in question had
been handled reasonably carefully since it left the bottler’s hands.278 Most bottle cases
therefore remained difficult to prove when grounded in negligence.279 In these
situations, the law of warranty provided the plaintiffs’ only hope. But many courts
continued to insist upon privity in bottle cases when a breach of warranty was
alleged.280

Graham L. Fricke, Personal Injury Damages in Products Liability, 6 VILL. L. REV. 1, 32 (1960). Four
years earlier, a similar observation had been made regarding judicial handling of a close cousin of the
exploding-bottle line of cases, the mouse-in-a-bottle case:
New York, for what appears to be the first time, applied res ipsa to a foreignobject-in-a-bottle case. The facts were typical. The bottling company’s evidence
indicated that a mouse couldn’t possibly have been in a bottle of coke, but there it
was just the same. This case is a good illustration of the way strict liability is
extending its grip in the area of manufacturer’s liability. Courts more and more are
taking the attitude that the industry must pay its way, regardless of “fault” in the
conventional sense. Once res ipsa is applied in a bottle case, for instance, the
bottler might as well give up the ghost. If he introduces no evidence, he is sure to
lose. If, on the other hand, he introduces evidence that his washing, capping, and
inspection systems are excellent, he will probably lose anyway because the jury will
conclude that, in the precautions are so high grade, some employee must have
erred in applying them. It is true for all practical purposes, therefore, that res ipsa in
such cases “has ceased to be a procedure for proving actual negligence to sustain
liability, and has become a means of establishing a basis for liability irrespective of
negligence.”
John V. Thornton & Harold F. McNiece, Torts, in 1955 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L., 433, 442 (Richard M.
McKay, ed., 1956) (footnote omitted).
278 E.g., Joffre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 158 A.2d 631, 636–37 (Md. 1960); Trust v. Arden
Farms Co., 324 P.2d 583, 585–86 (Cal. 1958); Burkett v. Panama City Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 93
So.2d 580, 582 (Fla. 1957).
279 See Julien, Trial Techniques, supra note 231, at 404 (describing bottle cases as “a real challenge”).
280 E.g., Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 A.2d 252, 257 (Del. 1961) (rejecting a
plaintiff’s claim in a bottle case on lack-of-privity grounds); Burke v. Assoc. Coca-Cola Bottling
Plants, Inc., 181 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959) (same); Prince v. Smith, 119 S.E.2d 923,
925 (N.C. 1961) (same); Wolfe v. S.H. Wintman Co., 139 A.2d 84, 86 (R.I. 1958) (same). See also
Christensen, supra note 259, at 385–86 (observing that in exploding-bottle cases, “the principal legal
problem [for the plaintiff] is the requirement of privity between the plaintiff and the defendant.”);
Hursh, Privity of Contract as Essential to Recovery in Action Based on Theory Other than Negligence, Against
Manufacturer or Seller of Product Alleged to Have Caused Injury, supra note 75, at 44–45 (discussing the
privity rule). Where the plaintiff had purchased the bottle, she typically could sue the retailer for
breach of an implied warranty. Christensen, supra note 259, at 386. But non-purchasing plaintiffs
lacked privity with even the retailer, and the bottler, not the retailer, was generally understood as the
party most to blame for an exploding bottle. Products Liability, supra note 220, at 291 (comments of
Alfred S. Julien). An additional problem that vexed plaintiffs in some states involved judicial limitation
of implied warranties to the contents of a container, as opposed to the contents and container
combined. See Christensen, supra note 259, at 386 (discussing this issue in the context of explodingbottle lawsuits).
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The ongoing post-World War II trend toward lifting the privity requirement
in food cases thus presented an opportunity for plaintiffs in bottle cases, and a
challenge for judges. Bottle cases stood at a crucial analogical pivot, halfway between
food and all other consumer products. On the one hand, increasingly widespread
rejection of a privity requirement in adulterated food cases begged the question of
why defective food containers should be treated any differently. Why should the
plaintiff’s recovery depend upon whether a soda bottle chipped on the inside,
depositing glass shards into a consumed drink, or on the outside, sending the shards
into the plaintiff’s hand?281 On the other hand, if courts accepted this analogy and
lifted the privity requirement for food containers, too, such a holding contained no
apparent limiting principle. If food containers, why not automobiles, space heaters,
or any other consumer good? In the 1950s, a few courts leapt into the breach,
rejecting a privity requirement for warranty claims in bottle cases.282 It was around
this time that proposals for strict products liability in tort began to coalesce into a
workable rule, through the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A.
Would some variation of Section 402A have come about, even without
bursting-bottle lawsuits? Almost certainly. Thought leaders like Prosser and Traynor
had lobbied for a strict-liability approach to products problems, grounded in tort, for
more than twenty years.283 Bottle cases only typified, rather than exhausted, their
concerns. And yet these cases deserve more than the obscurity in which they have
languished. Each time a bottle case appeared, from the 1940s through the 1960s,284 it
reminded even the most unimaginative judges of the nagging problems created by
the prevailing rules. The recurrence of these disputes, meanwhile, allowed courts to
use them as an ongoing experiment with negligence doctrine, trying to blaze a path
around the problems or proof associated with these cases (and other, similar case
types as well). In the end, these efforts gravitated toward a negligence approach in
name that imposed strict liability in fact. Judges who surveyed this record likely
found that it justified their more straightforward embrace of strict liability, whether
Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Fla. v. Shaw, 118 So.2d 840, 843 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1960), disapproved by
Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So.2d 221, 222 (Fla. 1965) (drawing this analogy). See also Note, Strict
Products Liability and the Bystander, supra note 77, at 929 (making this argument); Richard G. Wilson,
Products Liability – Part II – The Protection of the Producing Enterprise, 43 CAL. L. REV. 809, 821 (1955) (“it
is not self-evident that a marketer of a bottle which explodes should be held to bear less risks than the
marketer of a bottle which turns out to contain a foreign substance.”).
282 E.g., Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Fla. v. Shaw, 118 So.2d at 843; Nichols v. Nold, 258 P.2d 317,
323 (Kan. 1953); Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages, 102 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Oh. Com. Pl. 1951).
283 See text accompanying notes 61–63, supra.
284 The California Supreme Court, for example, heard three more bottle cases during the interval
between Escola and Greenman. Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 324 P.2d 583 (Cal. 1958); Zentz v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co. of Fresno, 247 P.2d 344 (Cal. 1952); and Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 203 P.2d 522
(Cal. 1949). These cases represented a substantial subset of all products cases heard by that court over
this span. See also Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Limited, 293 P.2d 26 (Cal. 1956) (cement); Rose v.
Melody Lane of Wilshire, 247 P.2d 335 (Cal. 1952) (collapsing stool installed at a restaurant).
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couched in warranty or in tort.285
Meanwhile, even if bottle cases did not prompt Section 402A, judging from
Dean Prosser’s pointed reference to bottle cases in his Assault on the Citadel article,
they likely informed the approach toward product defects that he promoted in the
Restatement. Much ink has been spilled over Prosser’s intentions in drafting Section
402A. In particular, there exists an ongoing dispute over whether Section 402A
contemplated only what are today known as “manufacturing” defects (with other
products claims being left to negligence law), or both these and other types of
product-defect allegations, such as lawsuits premised on unsafe designs and
inadequate warnings.286 The bottle cases suggest that this argument may be
orthogonal to the issue as Prosser perceived it, if one assumes his thinking was
framed by the recurring case tropes of his era. A glass bottle could explode or shatter
for any of several reasons. Among them, these bottles could be designed with glass
too thin to withstand successive reuse,287 a bottle could contain an inclusion or other
irregularities that made it more prone to shatter,288 the bottler could abrade and
thereby weaken the glass in cleaning prior to reuse,289 it could over-carbonate the
beverage inside,290 or it could damage the bottle when affixing the bottle cap. 291
Alternatively, the glass could be damaged by careless handling by the distributor,
retailer, plaintiff, or someone else,292 or the glass simply might break for reasons
unknown.293 Today, some of these fact patterns would be classified as involving
“manufacturing” defects, others as “design” defects, and still others as negligence.
To Prosser, an essential point of strict liability was to make these distinctions
essentially irrelevant to recovery, particularly as against the retailer. Per the
Restatement, the liability issue would instead simply hinge on whether the product
had failed to satisfy the expectations of a reasonable consumer. A soda bottle that
Indeed, bottle cases had served as a testing ground for doctrinal reforms well before the adoption
of strict products liability in tort. See Hewitt v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 284 P.2d 471, 475 (Utah
1955) (likening the exploding tire in the matter before the court to the exploding bottles addressed in
other cases, and concluding that the present case should be resolved under res ipsa loquitur rules
developed in the bottle cases).
286 Compare George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2301,
2303 (1989) (“the [creators of Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A] intended the Section’s
strict liability standard, with minor exceptions, to apply only to what we now call manufacturing
defect cases.”) with Michael D. Green, The Unexpected Congruity of the Second and Third Torts Restatements
on Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 836 (2009) (“Section 402A and the scholars and courts that
crafted it were concerned about easy cases in which products failed in performing at a minimal level
of safety. . . . In this era, the type of defect was not important.”).
287 Wald, supra note 267, at 9; Dingwall, supra note 260, at 167.
288 Wald, supra note 267, at 9; Dingwall, supra note 260, at 167.
289 Dingwall, supra note 260, at 168–69.
290 Wald, supra note 267, at 10.
291 Dingwall, supra note 260, at 161.
292 Wald, supra note 267, at 10.
293 See James, supra note 100, at 74–75 (discussing these possibilities).
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inexplicably exploded in the plaintiff’s hands certainly qualified under this test,
regardless of the source of the defect.294
In the final analysis, perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the bottle cases is
the fact that strict products liability, as extended to all products, was built atop a
fairly limited universe of decided cases,295 and the most numerous of these case types
has virtually disappeared.296 For several decades, bottle cases appeared in the
background (and sometimes the forefront) of the debate over products liability.
Even if these cases were banal, their ubiquity and their attendant body of caselaw
made them an integral part of the legal culture. Now they are mostly gone, and
essentially forgotten. Strict product liability lives on as a headstone. As a broader and
more debatable lesson, one might infer from this disconnect that the different
lifespans of specific case types on the one hand, and doctrine on the other, can make
it difficult to appreciate, in hindsight, the specific concerns that prompted judges of
other eras to adopt a given doctrinal innovation. Where now-defunct cases
contributed to a still-intact rule, modern observers may overestimate the importance
of broad policy arguments in making the case for change, and underestimate the
contributions made by particular problems associated with the most visible and
common cases of an earlier era.
Of course, judges vexed by bottle cases did not necessarily have to adopt a
tort solution to the problems presented by these matters; the law of warranty, with a
few adjustments, might have done the trick just fine. The next section of this Article
begins at this junction, and discusses why so many courts adopted an approach to
products liability grounded in tort law.

This perspective on original intentions, if credited, would tend to support the position taken by
Professor Green. See Green, supra note 286, at 836.
295 Priest, supra note 6, deconstructed the seemingly voluminous body of case citations that Prosser
tendered in support of Section 402A, and concluded that few supported a broad strict-liability-in-tort
principle. Id. at 514–17.
296 The infrequency with which bottle cases appear today captures in miniature the rarity of modern
litigation over “manufacturing” defects, the sort of defect (to impose modern terminology on the
cases of yesteryear) likely associated with most exploding or collapsing bottles. By the mid-1980s, at
the latest, design-defect cases were far more numerous than were manufacturing-defect cases.
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 303 (1987)
(charting the number of design-defect and manufacturing-defect cases heard by the federal courts of
appeals between January 1982 and November 1984); STAPLETON, supra note 137, at 30 (observing that
since the early 1980s, defective-design claims “have formed the overwhelming bulk of US product
lawsuits”). See also Peter Nash Swisher, Products Liability Tort Reform: Why Virginia Should Adopt the
Henderson-Twerski Proposed Revision of Section 402A Restatement (Second) of Torts, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 857,
890 (1993) ( “[M]anufacturing defect injuries are random and relatively rare events.”); Aaron D.
Twerski, Chasing the Illusory Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow: Negligence and Strict Liability in Design
Defect Litigation, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 7, 18 (2006) (“[m]anufacturing defects are rare events”).
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V. THE CONTINGENCY NARRATIVE: TORT VS. WARRANTY
A third and final story concerns how tort eclipsed warranty as the dominant
method of framing a products-liability claim. As late as the 1950s, most of those who
saw some form of strict products liability as inevitable assumed that this transition
would occur within the prevailing warranty rubric.297 Defying these expectations, tort
law came to conquer the field of consumer protection, with warranty law now
occupying a backup role.
In hindsight, it is easy to attribute this shift to certain perceived advantages of
a “pure” tort approach, such as that embodied in Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 402A, over a system grounded in warranty. Unlike warranty, a tort solution
was not encumbered by notice and disclaimer rules associated with generic sales law.
The tort approach also did not suffer from decades of name-calling by Prosser, who
was fond of describing warranty as “a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of
tort and contract,”298 among other choice epithets. But none of these problems were
intractable—Henningsen refused to honor a seemingly airtight disclaimer of
warranties,299 and Greenman gainsaid a notice requirement in warranty suits300 before
going on to recognize a tort remedy. Meanwhile, warranty had its competitive
advantages, too, the most important of which was inertia.301 The fact that even today,
Gillam, supra note 42, at 124. See also Note, Sales-Manufacturer and Dealers-Liability of a Supplier of Goods
to One Other than His Immediate Vendee, supra note 24, at 322. (“The theory most likely to be relied on
in the future as a means of holding the manufacturer liable to the ultimate consumer is the theory of
an implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer.”). Cf. Titus, supra note
131, at 781 (“One cannot help concluding that Greenman and section 402A would not have come into
being if the courts and lawyers had used the Sales Act warranties more creatively.”).
298 Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 60, at 1125. This comment
represented a continuation of Prosser’s longtime preference for a “pure” tort approach to products
liability over a scheme premised on warranty law. In 1941, he had written:
it seems far better to discard the troublesome sales doctrine of ‘warranty,’ and
impose strict liability outright in tort, as a pure matter of social policy. It is only by
some ‘violent pounding and twisting’ that the concept can be made to yield the
desired result; and the reliance traditionally necessary to a warranty is not easy to
find in the case of a consumer who does not even know who made the goods, or
who has not even made a purchase but is a mere donee.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 61, at § 83, quoting Patterson, The
Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 335, 358 (1924).
299 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d at 85–107. See also Jeffery W. Deaver, Note,
Products Liability in New York: Section 2-318 of the U.C.C. – The Amendment Without a Cause, 50 FORDHAM
L. REV. 61, 70–71 (1981) (discussing New York’s assimilation of the U.C.C., which the state adopted
in 1964, with its prior recognition of broad warranty protections).
300 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d at 900. For a discussion of the discretion
accorded judges in interpreting this requirement, see Morris G. Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products
Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and
Communication Barriers, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 5, 27–29 (1965).
301 An anecdote underscores this point. Observers were so conditioned to think of products liability in
warranty terms that the headline for the Los Angeles Daily Journal article that reported the Greenman
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a handful of states prefer a warranty framework for products claims suggests that the
broad, swift adoption of the tort approach may have owed to fortuitous
circumstances as much as any inherent superiority of a tort formulation. Specifically,
the preference for tort over warranty may owe to the fact that warranty was
compromised as an alternative to tort at an especially crucial juncture. By the time
this damage had been repaired, Section 402A already had gained a critical mass of
adherents.
A crucial setback for the warranty approach occurred in 1951, when the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, considering a draft
of the Uniform Commercial Code, rejected a provision that incorporated broad
warranty protections. A decade earlier, Karl Llewellyn had unsuccessfully sought to
engraft liberalized privity rules onto the Uniform Sales Act.302 This effort failed,303
but Llewllyn tried again with the U.C.C. In 1951, Llewellyn prepared a draft of the
U.C.C. that, within its proposed section 2-318, would have extended express and
implied warranties to “any natural person who is in the family or household of the
buyer or who is his guest or one whose relationship to him is such as to make it
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.”304
This approach was rejected in favor of a narrower view. As approved by the
Conference, section 2-318 extended warranties only to “any natural person who is in
the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable
to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty.”305 This language excluded persons such
as employees of the buyer, friends who were not houseguests, and bystanders.
Meanwhile, in its Comments, the Code expressed a neutral view about whether
remote purchasers could claim warranty protections, leaving the issue open for
development in the caselaw.306
decision read, “Injured Consumer Need Not Give Notice Under Sales Act.” Injured Consumer Need Not
Give Notice Under Sales Act, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 30, 1963, at 1. The revolutionary portion of the
Greenman opinion, grounding the plaintiff’s recovery in tort law, went unmentioned.
302 Note 63, supra.
303 Id.
304 U.C.C. § 2-318 (Proposed Final Draft Spring 1950). A Comment to this section provided that it
followed “the dominant trend of judicial opinion developed in the light of modern distribution
methods and the fact of group consumption,” and was “intended to broaden the right and the remedy
of the consumer in warranty, to free them from any technical rules as to ‘privity’ and to make them,
insofar as feasible, directly enforceable against the party ultimately responsible for any injury.” Id.,
cmt. 2.
305 U.C.C. § 2-318 (Final Text Edition November 1951). See also PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1966 OFFICIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 8 (1967) (discussing the history of section 2-318).
306 U.C.C. § 2-318, cmt. 3 (Official Draft Text and Comments Edition 1952); U.C.C, § 2-318, cmt. 3
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Section 2-318, as promulgated, quickly become the law in most states.
Between 1953 and 1967, the Uniform Commercial Code swept the nation, in the
same way that strict products liability in tort soon would. Only six states had adopted
the U.C.C. by the end of 1960. But eight states did so in 1961, four more in 1962, ten
in 1963, one in 1964, thirteen in 1965, five in 1966, and two in 1967, leaving
Louisiana as the lone holdout.307 (It would join the pack in 1974, adopting the Code
except for Articles 2 and 2A.)308 The version of the U.C.C. adopted by most states
parroted the language of section 2-318 as promulgated.309 There were some
dissenters, however. California and Utah declined to adopt section 2-318.310 In
California, where the Supreme Court already had extended warranty protections to
employees of the purchaser,311 concerns existed that the U.C.C.’s privity rules
represented a “step backward” from the status quo.312 Other states adopted
counterparts to section 2-318 that incorporated broader warranty protections than
appeared in the standard text. In 1961 and 1962, respectively, Wyoming and Virginia
adopted statutes that extended sales warranties to any person “who may reasonably
be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods” and was “injured in
person by breach of the warranty”313 (Wyoming) or “a person whom the
manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods” (Virginia).314
Notwithstanding these developments, upon revisiting the privity issue in
1964 the NCCUSL decided to stand pat with the existing language of section 2-318.
The Permanent Editorial Board observed that “At present there appears to be no
national consensus as to the scope of warranty protection which is proper.
Therefore, no amendment to the Official Text should be made in order to permit the

(1962 Official Text with Comments) (providing that the section was “neutral,” and “not intended to
enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller’s warranties, given to his buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.”).
307 FREDERICK H. MILLER, 12 WEST’S LEGAL FORMS, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS § 1.1 (2013).
308 Id.
309 See Brian D. Cochran, Emerging Products Liability Under Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Survey, 29 BUS. LAWYER 925, 939–45 (1974) (surveying state laws).
310 William Michael Karnes, Section 2-318 of the UCC: the Sleeping Giant, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 181, 186–
87 (1971). See also California State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, The Uniform Commercial
Code – A Special Report by the California State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, 37 J. ST. B. CAL. 117,
144 (1962) (explaining why California rejected section 2-318 of the U.C.C.).
311 Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 353 P.2d 575, 581 (Cal. 1960).
312 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE U.C.C., REPORT NO. 2 40 (1964).
313 Uniform Commercial Code, ch. 219, 1961 Wyo. Sess. Laws 406, 426–27.
314 An Act to Provide When Lack of Privity Shall Not Be a Defense in Action upon a Warranty or for
Negligence, ch. 476, 1962 Va. Acts 804, 804. See also William I. Aronwald, Note, Privity and Section 2318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 BROOK. L. REV. 367, 370–71 (1964) (discussing the Virginia and
Wyoming statutes).
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decisional development of such a consensus.”315 After other states also adopted
statutes with broadened warranty provisions over the next two years,316 in 1966 the
U.C.C.’s drafters finally yielded and proposed two “alternatives” (labeled
“Alternative B” and “Alternative C”) to the pertinent language of section 2-318.317
These alternatives followed the Virginia and Wyoming models by extending
warranties to any persons “who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods.”318 Alternative B extended warranties only for personal-injury
claims, while Alternative C did so for all claims.319 By 1974, a total of 17 states had
adopted either Alternative B or C, or had previously endorsed closely analogous
provisions.320
But by then, more than three dozen states had adopted a tort approach to
strict products liability, and it was too late for warranty to make up its lost advantage.
The timing of the U.C.C.’s adoption, relative to the Greenman decision and the
promulgation of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402, could not have been
better calibrated to nudge courts toward a torts approach to products-liability cases.
The narrow warranty protections of the U.C.C. doubtless encouraged courts in
adopting jurisdictions to look to tort law for a solution to ongoing products
problems. Even though the U.C.C. was neutral regarding judicial expansion of
“vertical” privity, at least, the boundary it drew around the family and household
insofar as “horizontal” privity was concerned may have convinced many judges that
they would be rewriting recently enacted law, contrary to the legislature’s intent, if
they cast additional consumer and bystander protections in warranty terms.321

PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE U.C.C., supra note 312, at 40. This declination caused one
set of authors to wonder, “After generating the monumental change wrought by the Code, are its
fathers now afraid to push their luck?” Kroner, et al., supra note 230, at 229.
316 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1966 OFFICIAL
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 8 (1967).
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 “Alternative B” provided that a seller’s express or implied warranty would extend to “any natural
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty.” Id. “Alternative C” extended the warranties to “any
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured by breach of the warranty.” All three Alternatives (the original text now being identified as
“Alternative A”) provided that the seller could not exclude or limit the operation of this section, at
least with respect to the person of an individual to whom the warranty, so redefined, extended. Id.
320 Cochran, supra note 309, at 939–45. In alphabetical order, these states were Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
321 See Kroner, et al., supra note 230, at 226 (observing that in arguing for strict liability, “Plaintiffs will
probably prefer to rely upon Restatement section 402A because of the reluctance of some courts to
extend the duty beyond that expressly defined in the Code”); Kames, supra note 310, at 181 (observing
that the enactment of U.C.C. Section 2-318 in many states “compelled courts to stretch, bend and
squeeze breach of warranty into the realm of strict liability in tort.”); Comment, UCC Section 2-318:
315
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Meanwhile, the excitement that surrounded the development of a coherent
theory of products liability in tort drowned out, for a few years, concerns that the
U.C.C.’s warranty provisions displaced or preempted alternative strict-liability
approaches to products liability.322 Some members of the American Law Institute
wondered about overlaps between the U.C.C. and the Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 402A when drafts of the products-liability provision of the treatise were
under consideration. These concerns were brushed aside, with Prosser disavowing
any conflict between the statute and the treatise.323 The first few courts to address the
subject likewise gave the matter short shrift, waving away defendants’ displacement
contentions.324
As years passed, however, it became more difficult to ignore this argument.
A prominent law-review article concluded that while the U.C.C. contemplated some
judicial expansion of warranty protections, certain provisions of the U.C.C., such as
its notice and disclaimer provisions, could not be avoided simply by replacing the
vocabulary of warranty with that of tort.325 Another author regarded the
Effect on Washington Requirements for Privity in Products Liability Suits, 42 WASH. L. REV. 253, 261 (1966)
(observing that while “The majority of courts seemingly do not regard section 2-318 as a restraint on
judicial resolution of the privity issue in warranty actions . . . the danger of a restrictive approach . . .
should not be overlooked.”). Cf. Mitchel J. Ezer, Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California
Law of Sales Warranties, 8 UCLA L. REV. 281, 327 (1961) (warning that if California were to adopt
section 2-318, doing so might “inadvertently reverse” recent caselaw that had extended warranties to
the employees of the product’s purchaser). A relatively recent study of the privity requirement in
jurisdictions that retain the “standard” language of section 2-318 found a relatively tangled web of
rules. William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions
That Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-318 (Alternative A), 20 PEPP. L .REV. 1215, 1220–22
(1993).
322 See Titus, supra note 131, at 715 & n. 13.
323 During the ALI’s consideration of the 1961 draft of Section 402A, Dean Prosser emphasized that
the U.C.C., in its comments to section 2-318, contemplated possible judicial engrossment of
warranties to remote purchasers. See Wednesday Morning Session, May 17, 1961, 38 A.L.I. PROC. 19, 77–
78 (1962). The next year, Prosser acknowledged that the Restatement “entrenched” upon the U.C.C.
insofar as both addressed liability to non-purchasers, but otherwise disclaimed any conflicts. Thursday
Afternoon Session, May 24, 1962, 39 A.L.I. PROC. 198, 238–240 (1963) (comments of William L.
Prosser).
324 Pearson v. Franklin Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133, 139 (S.D. 1977) (“In adopting the
doctrine of strict liability in tort . . . we did not pause to consider the potential conflict between the
warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and the concept of strict liability. In this we
were not alone.”). See also Franklin, supra note 80, at 974 (observing that “[r]ecently . . . several cases
have raised the possibility that the products liability development may be affected, indeed controlled,
by the Uniform Commercial Code. The possibility has been barely recognized – and still is not fully
appreciated.”); John W. Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and
Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REV. 123, 125 (1974) (noting that “up through the time of
writing, most courts had ignored the preemption argument,” but that there were “indications that
some judges, at least, may have a feeling of guilt regarding the matter, and the whole atmosphere is
one suggesting uneasiness and malaise.”).
325 Franklin, supra note 80. For other law-review articles expressing concern that the U.C.C. may
preempt or displace a strict-liability approach grounded wholly in tort, see Reed Dickerson, Products
Liability: Dean Wade and the Constitutionality of Section 402A, 44 TENN. L.R. 205 (1977); Reed Dickerson,
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displacement issue as a state-by-state affair, with the status of warranty law within a
jurisdiction prior to its adoption of the U.C.C. dictating whether warranty would
represent the exclusive vehicle for strict products-liability lawsuits in that state.326 In
the early 1970s, the first of these arguments found a taker in Oregon Supreme Court
Chief Justice Kenneth O’Connell, who wrote separately in a products-liability case to
express his opinion that
A careful reading of the Uniform Commercial Code reveals that it
prescribes a legal framework for the recovery of damages for
personal injuries resulting from defective products. Recovery for
personal injuries resulting from the negligent conduct of the seller is
left for the courts to develop. But it is apparent that aside from the
negligence cases the Code provides an integrated and comprehensive
scheme under which recovery for personal injuries may be sought
both by privity and non-privity plaintiffs.327
None of O’Connell’s colleagues joined his opinion, highlighting the marginal
nature of the displacement argument at the time. In 1980, however, the Delaware
Supreme Court unanimously concluded that strict products liability in tort had been
preempted by the state’s adoption of Alternative B to the U.C.C. in 1966.328 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court similarly observed that the Bay State legislature’s
“expansive amendments” to the U.C.C., added in 1971, meant that no space
remained for strict products liability.329 Through these amendments, the court said,
the Massachusetts legislature had “transformed warranty liability into a remedy
intended to be fully as comprehensive as the strict liability theory of recovery that
has been adopted by a great many other jurisdictions.”330
The point is not that this preemption argument is correct, only that it might
have persuaded a few more judges, had it more time to develop before courts rushed
to adopt strict products liability in tort. Such an interval also would have allowed
Was Prosser’s Folly Also Traynor’s? or Should The Judge’s Monument Be Moved to a Firmer Site? 2 HOFSTRA
L.R. 469 (1974); Donald J. Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform
Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965); Shanker, supra note 300.
Surveying the literature in 1983, John Wade observed that “the preemption viewpoint may perhaps be
the weightier side from the standpoints of both the number of articles and the vehemence of the
position taken.” Wade, Tort Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the U.C.C., supra
note 63, at 3–4.
326 Titus, supra note 131, at 760–82.
327 Markle v. Mulholland’s, Inc., 509 P.2d 529, 536 (O’Connell, C.J., concurring).
328 Cline v. Prowler Industries of Maryland, Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980). The Cline court
acknowledged that other states had rejected the preemption argument, but regarded those decisions as
distinguishable.
329 Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 649 N.E.2d 758, 763 n.6 (Mass. 1995).
330 Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968 (Mass. 1978).
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courts the opportunity to tinker with the newly adopted U.C.C. Decisions that
engrossed the U.C.C.’s warranty protections and limited its notice and disclaimer
provisions might have relieved some of the pressure for a solution for gnawing
products problems.331 Tellingly, states that embraced robust warranty protections at
an early juncture lagged behind other jurisdictions in adopting strict products liability
in tort. Among the states where legislatures enacted warranty protections more
expansive than those found in the initial version of section 2-318, only Minnesota
adopted strict products liability in tort during the 1960s, and that state’s high court
did so in a case that arose before the enhanced warranty protections became
effective.332 Most of the other Alternative B or Alternative C states took their time in
recognizing strict products liability in tort. The 17 states to adopt statutory variations
of Alternative B or C as of the early 1970s account for 11 of the 19 last states to
adopt strict products liability, and three of the five remaining holdouts.333 Wyoming
adopted strict products liability in tort only in 1986; Virginia never has. Thus
pioneers in one area of the law became laggards in another.
The differences between tort and warranty might seem like mere semantics,
given how warranty protections have been construed so broadly in Delaware,
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Virginia as to be essentially equivalent to strict liability
in tort.334 Even so, the different path taken by these states illustrates how there often
exists more than one doctrinal route to a generic objective, and that the amount of
traffic on each of these avenues may depend in large part on idiosyncratic
circumstances and matters of timing.
The status of products liability in the one true outlier, North Carolina, offers
additional instruction on this point. Among warranty states, only North Carolina has
adopted a truly distinctive approach. North Carolina courts never adopted a torts
One such decision was Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W. 129 (Mich. 1965). See also
Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (allowing a warranty suit by an
employee of the purchaser); Hyundai Motor America, Inc. v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947, 959 (Ind.
2005) (abolishing a “vertical privity” requirement); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903,
904 (Pa. 1974) (abolishing the “horizontal privity” requirement in warranty).
332 McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 500 n.13 (Minn. 1967).
333 The laggards were Alabama (1976), Arkansas (1973), Colorado (1975), Kansas (1976), Maine
(1973), Maryland (1976), North Dakota (1974), South Carolina (1974), South Dakota (1973), Vermont
(1975), and Wyoming (1986); the holdouts are Delaware, Massachusetts, and Virginia. See supra note
132 and text accompanying note 136.
334 See Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Maryland, Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 976 (Del.1980) (“the defenses of
privity, notice, and disclaimer have, in large measure, become ineffective in consumer product liability
cases in this State”); Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Mass. 1978) (“The Legislature has
made the Massachusetts law of warranty congruent in nearly all respects with the principles expressed
in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965)”); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 268 N.W.2d 291,
293 (Mich. App. 1978) (“the requisite elements for a cause of action based upon strict liability in tort
are congruent to those for breach of warranty.”); OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 136,
at 281–85 (discussing all five states’ approaches toward products liability).
331
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approach to strict products liability prior to the enactment of a statute in 1979 that
made products-liability cases more difficult for plaintiffs to win335 and a 1995 statute
that expressly prohibited judicial recognition of strict products liability in tort.336
These developments mean that, more so than any other state, North Carolina still
relies on negligence and warranty law as rules of decision in products-liability cases.337
Insofar as claims against product manufacturers are concerned, however, this
difference does not place many North Carolina plaintiffs in much worse of a
position than their counterparts elsewhere.338 Since most contemporary productsliability claims involve design or warning issues,339 where even strict liability has
gravitated toward what resembles a negligence approach, the burden that North
Carolina plaintiffs bear is strikingly similar to that cast upon claimants in other states.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the conventional history of strict products liability represents the most
famous tale of doctrinal evolution in tort law, its marginalization of other narratives
is fairly typical. The three supplemental stories related above have been obscured by
blind spots and biases that recur across legal histories generally,340 and histories of
tort law in particular.
First, there exists a tendency to focus on the obvious. When assigning
responsibility for shifts in tort law, pioneering judicial opinions, law-review articles,
An Act Relating to Civil Actions for Damages for Personal Injury, Death or Damage to Property
Resulting from the Use of Products, ch. 654, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 687. Among its provisions, this
statute interposed contributory negligence as a defense to all products-liability actions, whether
framed in negligence or warranty, id. at § 1, and created a six-year statute of repose, id. at § 2. The
period before repose has since been increased to 12 years. An Act to Clarify and Reform the Statutes
of Limitations and Repose in Product Liability Actions, ch. 420, §2, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 808.
336 An Act to Amend the Law Regarding Products Liability, ch. 522, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1872,
1873.
337 Moore v. Coachmen Industries, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 772, 777 (N.C. App. 1998) (“A products liability
plaintiff may base the claim on various causes of action, including negligence (negligent design,
manufacture, assembly, or failure to provide adequate warnings) and breach of warranty.”) See also
DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 565 S.E.2d 140 (N.C. 2002) (allowing a plaintiff in a products case to
proceed on an implied warranty theory); Red Hill Hosiery Mill, Inc. v. MagneTek, Inc., 582 S.E.2d
632 (N.C. App. 2003) (affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff on an implied-warranty theory).
338 A more significant hurdle for North Carolina plaintiffs in products cases is the fact that
contributory negligence (still recognized in that state) represents a defense to all products-liability
claims, whether framed in negligence or in tort. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4(3) (2011).
339 See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Torts 2.0: The Restatement 3rd and the Architecture of Participation in
American Tort Law, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1582, 1592 (2011) (“defective design . . . came to
dominate the products liability caseload of courts in the latter part of the twentieth century.”);
Dominick Vetri, Order out of Chaos: Products Liability Design-Defect Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1373, 1375
(2009) (“Product design defects are the predominate type of litigated [products liability] cases today.”).
340 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 71 (discussing these tendencies and biases).
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and treatises all probably receive more credit than they deserve, while the evolution
of claim consciousness of prospective plaintiffs and the capabilities and interests of
their attorneys often do not receive enough attention.341 This “top-down” bias
follows from the relative visibility and measurability of these influences. The former
contributions are memorialized in print, and their influence readily gleaned from
citation counts.342 The existence and importance of the latter must be inferred
obliquely from facts and circumstances that may not stand out in the historical
record. But the fact that these forces are difficult to detect does not mean that they
are irrelevant to doctrinal change. Quite the contrary; as related above, without
plaintiffs and counsel, courts would lack both raw material with which to work, and a
sense of urgency in their task.
For similar reasons, it is easy to underestimate the importance of old case
tropes whose significance lay not in the novelty in their facts, but instead in the
frequency with which they appeared. Bottle cases were bread-and-butter matters for
the personal-injury attorneys of the 1940s and 1950s, and judges of that era certainly
knew about these cases and the problems they presented. The prosaic nature of these
disputes and their subsequent disappearance has erased them from the popular
consciousness. This invisibility, combined with the seeming indignity of attributing
broad doctrinal shifts to particular case tropes, has meant that bottle cases are
assigned no credit in the development of strict products liability. This omission
seems wrong, for the same reason that it would seem improper for a history of
Colonial times to entirely ignore facts such as slower communication networks,
shorter lifespans, and the prevalence of since-eradicated diseases. Just as these
conditions influenced how the people of a time viewed their world, bottle cases were
an important part of the Traynor’s and Prosser’s environments. It seems hardly
coincidental that for good or for ill, the products-liability framework that Prosser
devised was perfectly attuned to the difficulties associated with bottle cases.
Furthermore, not many courts would have felt compelled to adopt strict products
liability in tort had judges regarded this approach as applicable to only a handful of
disparate cases. Bottle lawsuits provided both a face and a center of gravity to a
polyglot array of products matters. By instantiating and grounding the argument for a
strict-liability approach, these cases may have helped persuade courts that the reform
game was worth the candle.
Finally, the history of strict products liability provides additional evidence of
another bias—an overeagerness to treat doctrinal change as inevitable, once it
already has happened.343 It seems likely that by the Atomic Age, circumstances had
Id.
See id. at 120 (commenting on the accessibility and utility of “mandarin materials” such as cases and
treatises).
343 Id. at 71.
341
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aligned so as to guarantee some additional protections to the consumer. But it was
not similarly preordained that these protections would be cast in the language of
“pure” tort law, as opposed to warranty. Had circumstances changed only modestly,
perhaps ten or more states would have preferred to continue to tinker with the
prevailing warranty rules, instead of making the leap to a “pure” tort solution. If so,
the products-liability landscape today might resemble the division of authority
regarding landowner liability, with a rough equilibrium having been reached between
states that retain a “traditional” approach (tempered by exceptions that avoid undue
hardships for worthy plaintiffs) and those that have modernized their law to
recognize a duty of reasonable care owed to an engrossed cohort of entrants upon
the land (also subject to various exceptions).344
To draw a concluding metaphor, by recognizing and accounting for these
blind spots and biases, one can appreciate that strict products liability in tort was, in
effect, a product itself. Doctrinal advances made in early cases involving food
products and exploding bottles served as prototypes for further innovation, and
effectively “auditioned” this innovation for a broader audience. Consumers and their
attorneys provided the raw case materials through which judges adopted strict
liability, as this doctrine had been packaged by academics. And just as seemingly
unimportant inflection points have proven pivotal in resolving other technological
rivalries,345 strict liability in tort prevailed over a warranty-based theory of products
liability theory as much because of quirks of fate than due to any material, inarguable
superiority of a “pure” tort approach.

See Robert L. Rabin, Rowland v. Christian: Hallmark of an Expansionary Era, in TORTS STORIES, supra
note 35, 73, 91–95 (discussing this division of authority).
345 See, e.g., Michael A. Cusumano et al., Strategic Maneuvering and Mass-Market Dynamics: The Triumph of
VHS over Beta, 66 BUS. HIST. REV. 51, 86 (1992).
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